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ABSTRACT 
Hebblethwaite, Richard .  M.A., Department of Political Science, Wright State University, 2013. 
The Little Brother Syndrome And Nuclear Proliferation, An Exploratory Analysis of Pakistan 
and North Korea’s Risk Prone Policies 
 
 
          The successful pursuit of nuclear weapons technology by Pakistani and North Korean 
leaders has fundamentally shifted the post war nuclear paradigm that established the monopoly 
of five nuclear powers over nuclear weapons and supplies of fissile materials under the Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT). How does one explain the daring nuclear pursuit of Pakistan and 
North Korea and their success in achieving this capability?  Numerous theories have tried to 
explain both the rationale and the causal factor(s) for nuclear proliferation and specifically 
nuclear arms.  While realism and neo-realism concentrate on the fear of the unknown; i.e.,       
the international system and military power and rivalries, there has been scant, if any, efforts    
by scholars to researching the background psychological motivations of the state for those who 
make nuclear proliferation decisions, the political leaders.  In this analysis, I have sought to 
understand nuclear proliferation through the prism of what I term “Little Brother Syndrome.”   
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
Statement of the Problem 
 
 
     The proliferation of nuclear technology information and hardware used for the creation of 
nuclear weapons has recalibrated the ranking of nations in the international community.  No 
longer limited by economic power or global military standing, small non- and semi-democratic 
countries can attain the firepower and capabilities once maintained by only the largest world 
powers.  This hegemonic effect of nuclear weapons gives minor nation-states the means to 
surpass international political boundaries imposed by the larger world system and thrust their 
own political policies and agendas onto the world stage.   
     The use of psychological insights data on how humans learn to perceive their surroundings 
may give us an additional reference points regarding states actions and national level nuclear 
decisions.  How could this be?  In a revolutionary 1964 film entitled “7-Up”, British director, 
Paul Almold, documented 14 school age children at age seven and conducted filmed interviews 
every seven years thereafter.  Later taken over by Michael Apted, both directors provided a 
documented theory showing how these later adults all retained their psychological profile as 
exhibited in the very first film’s interviews.1   
     Using the films as a foundation, I studied how children are influenced by their closest 
associates; fathers, mothers, brothers and sisters, i.e. their nuclear family.  As I continued my 
research on inter-organizational functions within the typical western or Asian nuclear family,  
my thoughts also turned to hierarchies and how each individual perceives his/her family ranking.    
I am the youngest sibling in a family of seven, and being a little brother helped me focus on the 
psychology of same.   
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     The psychology of a little brother is what I term “Little Brother Syndrome”.  Little brothers 
often have the feeling that a rivalry exists between them and their older siblings even though 
often, the older sibling is not even aware a rivalry exists.  Little brother thinks his older siblings 
are seen as being far superior to the youngest family members. The older siblings do not see little 
brother as a threat but the reverse is not true.  Little brother is extremely competitive and will 
fight to gain the status of his rival as well as the attention of those in charge, the parents.  
Righting this perceived wrong and forcing the rival to acknowledge the “win” so as to be seen   
as an equal is the purpose of his continuous fight.   
      In comparison, twentieth century social scientists have attempted to explain the variables  
and causal factors state leaders use in their political decision making processes.  The most  
widely recognized and accepted social science theory came about as a result of nuclear weapons.  
Morgenthau’s 1948 Realism Theory stated social scientists should treat a nation as a single 
individual acting upon its own best interests.2  While researching Pakistan and North Korean 
nuclear proliferation efforts; it struck me that the behaviors of the two countries’ leaders were 
very similar to those of little brothers.  The question I seek to answer:  Do the countries of 
Pakistan and North Korea have Little Brother Syndrome, and can it explain the motivations of 
these leaders when dealing with their more powerful siblings, India and South Korea as well as 
the International Community? 
 
The Research Question 
     Can the “Little Brother Syndrome” help explain how certain states react with the international 
community and why a limited number of political leaders have chosen to engage in nuclear 
weapons proliferation? 
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Subordinate Questions 
1.  How did Little Brother Syndrome become established in Pakistan and North Korea? 
2. Did LBS help Pakistan and North Korea exploit loopholes in the International 
System, particularly with their state support of terrorism and the pursuit of nuclear 
weapons? 
3. Why Realism or Neorealism cannot fully explain Pakistan’s, and North Korea’s 
actions regarding state terrorism and their pursuit of nuclear weapons? 
 
Literature Review 
Major Social Science Theories and Nuclear Weapons: 
     Hans Morgenthau’s “Politics Among Nations” came out in 1948 just before the beginning of 
the nuclear age.  In 1949, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) detonated its first 
nuclear weapon.  What began as a peaceful coexistence between the two remaining post World 
War II superpowers soon escalated into a series of confrontational actions without direct combat.  
Morgenthau’s realism theory was not written to predict a state’s nuclear behavior.  The political 
and military actions of both the Soviet Union and the United States, however, demonstrated 
aspects of realism’s “power politics”.  As the weapon that has the most destructive capabilities 
known to man, thermonuclear weapons represented both the absolute best and the absolute worst 
aspects of realism’s “power”, the threat of (nuclear) war.  American nuclear weapons were used 
to threaten the Soviets from further global expansionism and military domination.  Realism was 
not just a social theory but a strategic foreign policy practiced and used by the United States.  
The Cold War, realism based policies, and nuclear weapons soon became and have remained 
forever-after intertwined. 
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     Focusing on military capabilities within the international relations system, neo-realists have 
written extensively on nuclear weapons issues.  Authors such as Robert Jervis, John 
Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, Kenneth Waltz and others have produced numerous articles and 
books on such matters as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), recent attempts by both 
members and non-members to obtain nuclear weapons capabilities, the use of nuclear weapons 
after the Cold War, and nuclear weapons deterrence and policies.  In his 1984 book The Illogic 
of American Nuclear Strategy Robert Jervis defends the Mutual Assured Destruction or MAD 
theory and shuns the critics who were pushing for Ronald Reagan’s nuclear superiority posture.3  
Stephen Walt’s 1987 book Origins of Alliances introduces a refinement of the realist balance of 
power theory with his own defensive neo-realist “Balance of Threat” theory.4   
     The one area where neo-realism reaches its zenith is with Kenneth Waltz’s The Spread of 
Nuclear Weapons – A Debate Renewed.5  Waltz counters his chief opponent Scott D. Sagan in 
this single 2003 work by proclaiming the spread of nuclear weapons as a positive mechanism for 
states to pursue their interests and secure their international borders.  His work supports the 
spread of weapons and uses the Indian-Pakistani military dispute over the Jammu-Kashmir 
provinces to demonstrate how nuclear weapons have successfully defused a territorial dispute.  
In response, Sagan supports organizational theory pessimists who fear preemptive strikes, an 
accidental launch, or how improper command and control of nuclear assets may actually set the 
stage for nuclear warfare within twenty-first century South Asia.  Waltz counters by saying that 
the danger nuclear weapons poses forces a state’s leaders to behave as rational actors and seek 
other ways or means to end a dispute.  Sagan feels it is the human factor of irrationality that is 
the gravest concern and that in the heat of an argument, one side or the other will use their 
ultimate weapon as a means of obtaining their self-interests.6 
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     Kenneth Waltz’s pro-nuclear expansion belief is cited by academic authors to explain the 
reasoning why South Asian states are experimenting with nuclear armaments to secure territorial 
boundaries.  Kanti Bajpai’s “The BJP and the Bomb” (Inside Nuclear South Asia) cites Waltz’s 
position that nation-states who face nuclear rivals have a strong incentive to seek their own 
nuclear weapons.7  As a social scientist advocating the expansion, proliferation and use of 
nuclear weapons for deterrence capabilities, Waltz’s position has put neo-realism at the forefront 
of this twenty-first century nuclear debate. 
 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Nuclear Policy, Historical South-Asia 
     There is a plethora of writing about nuclear proliferation in South Asia, and especially, 
historical accounts of the A.Q. Khan affair.  S. Paul Kapur’s Dangerous Deterrent, Nuclear 
Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia was a central piece that took a critical look as 
to whether or not the Indian-Pakistan nuclear programs have brought security to their territorial 
border dispute.8  He writes about the Cold War stability/instability theory and South Asia’s 
continuing conventional violence.  He counters Waltz’s theory by saying that nuclear weapons 
may actually “tempt countries to fight small wars” and maintains that India’s and Pakistan’s 
nuclear assets have increased instability.9  His 2008 MIT Press article “Ten Years of Nuclear 
Instability in a Nuclear South Asia” implies that Pakistan is willing to risk small scale incursions 
into India’s Jammu and Kashmir provinces because both sides achieved their nuclear goals.10  
“Allah’s Bomb, The Islamic Quest for Nuclear Weapons” by Al J. Venter is a reporter’s 
historical account of nuclear proliferation by South Asian, African, and the North Korean 
governments.11  Venter is a military weapons and intelligence analyst writer for Jane’s Defense 
who believes nuclear proliferation is still occurring.  He has written that while world news 
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outlets are emphasizing the end of the A. Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network, the former 
middlemen used by Khan are still proliferating nuclear technology know how and the duel use 
hardware necessary to create weapons of mass destruction.12  His book serves as a warning to 
Western nations, that Islamic countries are still seeking nuclear technology so as to equal the 
capability threats Western militaries possess.  Another historical intelligence reference is 
journalists’ Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark’s Nuclear Deception, The Dangerous 
Relationship Between the United States and Pakistan.13  These detailed works account for the 
illegal and clandestine schemes used by Pakistan to obtain nuclear material and technology.  The 
Pakistani attempts to profit from the selling of this technology and the hardware to produce 
enriched uranium demonstrate the ease with which A.Q. Khan’s activities succeeded in securing 
state interests.14  Devin Hagerty’s The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, Lessons from 
South Asia details how preemptive attacks against nuclear research facilities were planned by 
both India and Pakistan and how incidents like Brasstacks in 1987 and the 1999 Kargil 
Campaigns placed not just these two countries but the rest of the world at peril for a nuclear 
winter.15  Philip O’Neill, Jr.’s Verification in an Age of Insecurity, The Future of Arms 
Control Compliance is a review of current international laws regarding arms control and the 
need for reform to address rogue states.16  He questions current international nuclear policies and 
discusses possible solutions for new legislation and proposes new technical procedures.  O’Neil 
believes North Korea could provide the test case to see if his proposed technical detection 
standards would accomplish their intended goals.17   
     Another detailed account on the extensive A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation schemes is Gordon 
Corera’s 2006 book Shopping For Bombs.18  Corera surprises the reader with his intelligence 
analyst style of writing about Khan’s dealings with North Korea, China and Iran.  Being closed 
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societies ruled by totalitarian regimes, Corera delivers evidence of their unmistakable 
cooperative efforts of nuclear weapons research and design.  He alleges Chinese officials gave 
Pakistan nuclear weapon blueprints violating Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty protocols.  In 
exchange for Uranium 235 enrichment processes, North Korea sent advanced No-Dong missiles 
to Pakistan while Khan was selling P-1 enrichment centrifuges to Iran.  Confirming Corera’s 
allegations is Mark Fitzpatrick’s The Iranian Nuclear Crisis, Avoiding Worst Case Outcomes.19  
Using International Atomic Energy Agency reports on their inspections of Iranian nuclear 
facilities, he verifies Corera’s reports and updates the reader on Iranian attempts to by-pass 
United Nations sanctions and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty mandates.20  
 
Refining My Analysis:  Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Psychology 
     While researching nuclear weapons, I found an informational subset that examines the 
psychology of nuclear deterrence.  I explored this subset to investigate if any of the authors used 
human psychology as a potential causal explanation for nuclear proliferation.  This avenue of 
approach was explored very briefly in the early 1970’s but was quickly abandoned.  The search 
for an explanatory psychology theory soon switched to an emphasis on counseling families to 
ease their fears of potential nuclear war.  The escalating Cold War locked down most attempts at 
nuclear proliferation and the interest topic was soon lost.   
     Psychology as an explanatory factor for nuclear proliferation appeared nearly 25 years later in 
author George Perkovich’s book India’s Nuclear Bomb, The Impact On Global Proliferation.21  
He contends it is a country’s political parties which seek nuclear weapons as a means to 
psychologically improve their party’s popular consent.   Sumit Ganguly in his Conflict 
Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947 also asserts that it is the country’s 
7 
 
governmental leaders and political elites that pursue acquisition of nuclear weapons as a 
psychological source of state nationalism to bolster their own individual popularity.22  Both these 
authors used group psychology as a factor for proliferation decision by political leaders, but none 
of these works attribute proliferation decisions to the psychological predispositions that existed 
in the countries.      
     In 2002, Saira Kahn’s, Nuclear Proliferation Dynamics In Protracted Conflict Regions 
attempted to explain nuclear proliferation using protracted conflicts as a stressful psychological 
consideration for nuclear proliferation.23  Through her detailed and precise examination of events 
and causes, she explains why the South Asian countries of India and Pakistan, and the Middle 
Eastern countries, Iran versus Iraq, Israel versus Egypt, and Israel versus Syria all sought nuclear 
arms.  Her work found those countries with multiple conflicts or wars are more likely to conduct 
nuclear technology and/or nuclear weapons proliferation to enhance their countries’ security.  
She explains if the protracted territorial border dispute is resolved, such as Egypt’s and Israel’s 
did in 1977 with the Camp David Accords, countries are less likely to seek nuclear weapons.  
Egypt ceased trying to acquire nuclear weapons following Camp David.  States with unresolved 
disputes such as India and Pakistan continue until both sides have proven their nuclear weapons 
existence.24  Overall, the stress of a protracted conflict is what, she says, causes a country’s 
leaders to seek nuclear weapons in order to even their country’s capabilities with that of their 
antagonizer.    
     Jacques E.C. Hymans’ The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, Identity, Emotions, and 
Foreign Policy categorizes individual leaders’ psychology into four groupings: Sportsmanlike 
Nationalists, Sportsmanlike Subalterns, Oppositional Nationalists, and Oppositional Subalterns.25  
Sportsmanlike Nationalist politicians try to get along with their international peers and show 
8 
 
themselves as leaders while Sportsmanlike Subalterns seek to align their countries with a larger 
international leader or alliance.  Opposition Nationalists blame international “others” as the 
source of their country’s troubles and they want to be the top leaders in the international 
community.  Oppositional Subalterns do not have international leadership ambitions and so align 
themselves with the more powerful international community members.  Divided into four 
groups, Hyman suggests it is how the individual in each group sees their National Identity 
Conceptions that influence their political decisions.  Or in other words, how an individual 
perceives their country’s strengths (or lack thereof) also includes an emotional side when 
deciding to seek nuclear weapons.  Hymans contends Oppositional Nationalists are the most 
likely leaders who push their countries to obtain nuclear weapons.26  His book focuses on the 
leaders of four countries, France, India, Australia and Argentina and describes how the leaders of 
the first two made the decision to obtain nuclear weapons while the leaders of the last two 
decided against it.  Using their public speeches, he ranks the remarks of Oppositional 
Nationalists leaders on their use of fear, a sense of urgency and emotional claims of nationalism 
in order to say the state needs nuclear weapons to be secure.  He then uses those rankings to 
statistically prove how Oppositional Nationalist leaders are the proliferators of nuclear weapons 
both before and after the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was formally established.  
 
Psychology, Nuclear Family, and Behavioral Dynamics 
     What my literature search found was that the individual human psychology of political 
leaders/elites as a motivational/causal factor for nuclear proliferation has largely been ignored.  
Exploring psychological motivations of national leaders and combining it with other 
determinants could provide a better understanding of why some nations pursue proliferation as 
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the cornerstone of their national security strategy.  In two works referred above, Perkovich and 
Ganguly see the leader’s motivation to win popular support by manipulating people’s perception 
by pursuing nuclear weapons in their favor.  One needs to understand why it is that people will 
positively react to proliferation decisions by their leaders. Threat perception from foreign 
countries (especially from perceived enemies) and increased sense of national security from 
nuclear capabilities obviously appear to be the prime explanation. However, one also needs to 
ask if the leaders themselves are immune from such psychological perception.  For example, if 
people in India, in general, feel threatened by the military (both conventional and nuclear) might 
of China, are not the leaders equally insecure dealing with the Chinese leaders or worried about 
the Chinese threat.  Could it then be said that the leaders’ sense of inferiority vis-a-vis an 
adversary that has proven military superiority inculcate a lingering psychological inferiority into 
the minds of the leaders of the nation seen as inferior in this power equation?  These challenged 
leaders, I argue, suffer from little brother syndrome, which turns them into oppositional 
nationalists who, as discussed above, have greater tendency to proliferate.  If this is plausible, 
then the perception of and resentment towards the inherent weakness in relations to an adversary 
emerges as a key factor that propel the leaders of lesser powers to seek a greater balance; this 
could as, Hyman’s typology posits, be done through alliances with greater powers or through 
proliferation.  I found the need for further research of this possible explanation.   
     When I accidently referenced “nuclear” and “family” during a library database search, the 
results prompted me to explore how individuals’ learning techniques and decision making 
abilities are initially formed.  Specifically, behavioral psychology has explored how personality 
and social traits are significantly influenced during a person’s early childhood from six months to 
twelve years old by their nuclear families.  (Note: Using behavioral science terms, “nuclear 
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families” consist of a father, mother, child, and any sibling(s).)  Children in Cooperation and 
Competition author Emmy Pepitone details how it was not until the 1950’s that early childhood 
studies on sibling behavior and interaction were seriously investigated.27  Authors Ann Minnett, 
Deborah Vandell, and John Santrock have written about the propensity of the youngest male 
child to act aggressively against the oldest sibling particularly when there is an age difference of 
two to three years.  Their article “The Effects of Sibling Status on Sibling Interaction: Influence 
of Birth Order, Age Spacing, Sex of Child, and Sex of Sibling” details the observations made 
and the statistical analysis of the observed children.28  Their study concluded that “the highest 
level of aggression occurred in boys with a brother”.29  These interactions are what I call “the 
little brother syndrome”.  The youngest brother feels he has to prove to himself, to his larger 
family, and particularly to the oldest male brother that he is an equal family member.  As the 
youngest member of a multi-sibling family, or of a sibling dyad, the little brother’s competitive 
psychological drive is to prove that he is a person to be contended with and or be reckoned.  
Driven by this fierce competitiveness, he will fight and will continue intensifying all efforts for 
recognition as an equal despite having been repeatedly corrected or simultaneously defeated.   
     In comparison to Khan’s and Hymans’ writings, the actions described by Minnett, Vandell, 
and Santrock have a remarkable similarity to the actions of nation-state actors and political party 
leaders who are nuclear proliferators.  Specifically, the “little brother syndrome” when compared 
to “Oppositional Nationalists” appeared to have some of the same psychological characteristics.  
The correlations of aggressiveness, competitiveness, and the intense desire to be at the same 
level or above seemed to be very real.  The intent for Oppositional Nationalists is to be 
recognized as a leader by the international community.  For little brothers, their intent is to be 
recognized and confirmed by their older brothers and the parent(s) as an equal family member.  
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In short, Hymans’ work substantiates and validates the need for further psychological research as 
to the cause and/or establishment of Oppositional Nationalists.   
     The primary research question is to find out if “the little brother syndrome” can help explain 
how certain states react with the international community and why a limited number of political 
leaders have chosen to engage in nuclear weapons proliferation. The little brothers in my study 
are the countries of Pakistan and North Korea. Both Pakistan and North Korea were born amidst 
conflicts that resulted in the partition of the earlier nations. The leaders of both these countries 
had perception of isolation and weakness and had deep rooted perception of their national 
survival being at stake.  They also found that they could not count on the international 
community as a credible reassurance for their security and hence the need to become more 
innovative and manipulative to overcome their insecurity.    
     The counterpoint, however, is that most of the information needed for the qualitative review 
of Pakistan’s and North Korea’s leaders is not easily obtainable.  Using the countries’ histories, 
including the records of their nuclear proliferation attempts, cultural family studies and recently 
declassified intelligence sources, I believe enough background information may be found to 
make a plausible case to support my analysis.  Once only reserved for state intelligence analysts, 
recently written family histories and biographies of these two countries’ major leaders may also 
provide the needed clues.   
     The second counterpoint that could be made is the actual leaders themselves and whether or 
not “the little brother syndrome” is applicable to the make-up of their own Asian nuclear 
families.  A psychological review of the South Asia and Eastern Asia nuclear family may be just 
as important as birth order and the family’s members.  Individual psychological status may not 
be tied as a direct causal agent due to the fact people may change psychologically as they 
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progress through life.  Can the same behavioral patterns attributed to a seven to twelve year old 
boy be the same when the boy is a young man or an older gentleman? 
     The third counterpoint is the relationship between government leaders’ personalities and the 
“character” of the state.  Is the state characterized by its leader(s)?  In other words, does the state 
take on the same attributes as a person but expressing itself through its leaders?  Are institutions 
instrumental in building the reputation and/or character of a state and can state institutions 
influence state leaders and their decisions?   
     The Constructionist school of approach asserts that the international community is explained 
in terms of “what your expectations are influences your perceptions”.30  In other words, if a 
country’s political elites assume the international community to be always hostile, they would 
prepare for wars, expect wars, and will fight wars.  If the political elites perceive the 
international community to be peaceful, then, they would expect peace, practice peace and 
embrace peaceful intentions.  Constructionists believe the international community is about 
individual psychology as well as international community members’ own psychology i.e. self-
identity conception(s).31  Using this theory, could psychology and behavior sciences have 
explanatory powers of nation-state actions and nation-state actors?  Is the “little brother 
syndrome” a causal factor for Pakistan and North Korea to seek nuclear weapons as a means to 
influence the international community?   
 
Procedure 
Methodology/Research Design 
     In order to answer the main question and the three subordinate research questions, I am 
planning to use open source histories of Pakistan and North Korea and their leaders to find out if 
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and how LBS could be applicable in these two countries.  I am planning to research newly 
declassified archives from past U.S. presidential administrations and those of both European 
allies and foes.  I am hoping to use this research to explore if the International Community has in 
existence an overarching ability that rules over other countries within the system.  Using that 
information, did LBS help Pakistan and North Korea exploit any International Community 
weaknesses, particularly with their state support of terrorism and the pursuit of nuclear weapons?  
The last question is can Realism or Neorealism fully explain Pakistan’s and North Korea’s 
actions including those of state supported terrorism and their pursuit of nuclear weapons?  By 
reexamining the usefulness of each realism/neorealism theory, I am hoping to prove they lack the 
cohesiveness that LBS has regarding international actions. 
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Chapter Two 
Pakistan 
     Conceived in peace but born of fire, Pakistan’s history does not project a country ready for an 
end to its sibling rivalry with India.  Pakistan’s political and military leaders have stoked the 
flames of religious animosity and existential threat from India in order to sow public discontent 
with its much larger neighbor.32  This redirection of its public focus has shifted Pakistani 
society’s attention away from its own civil and military failings.  In their place, the searing focus 
bears down on religion as a heated means of outward hostility and as a central cause for its 
massive spending on military preparedness.33  By intermittently striking at its territorial neighbor 
politically and militarily, Pakistan’s actions are contradictory to International Community 
expectations, standards and norms.  Can the “Little Brother Syndrome” help explain how 
Pakistan reacts with the international community and why its political leaders chose to engage in 
nuclear weapons proliferation?             
     So how did Little Brother Syndrome become established in Pakistan? The roots of Pakistan’s 
innate need for a sibling rivalry with India lie in how the nation emerged out of colonial India.  
Pakistan’s existence is owed to the inability of colonial India’s resistance movement to 
politically maintain the provincial ties the British originally established.  When it became 
apparent in 1947 that British power was truly going to depart colonial India, both Hindu and 
Muslim sides of the Indian resistance movement agreed to a peaceful split of certain Indian 
provinces.34  Under the India Independence Act of 1947, Vice-Roy Mountbatten was instructed 
by the Home Office to allow the 587 Princes to decide whether to remain with India or East and 
West Pakistan.  The Princes were the deciders but consideration was meant to be given to the 
populations’ religious and ethnic majorities.  India’s Muslims would have their own countries of 
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West Pakistan and East Pakistan with the rest of the majority Hindu provinces remaining as one 
India.   
     The problems between the Indian National Congress and the Indian Muslim League 
intensified when both sides began arguing over specific provinces.  The Indian National 
Congress and the Indian Muslim League both agreed to establish the Bengal and Punjab 
Boundary Commissions.  Each party would choose two members (2 Muslim and 2 Non-Muslim) 
with both commissions having a European chairman to make a decision if the commission was 
deadlocked.  The United Kingdom State Department chose Sir Cyril Radcliffe, Vice-Chairman 
of the General Council of the English Bar who was suggested by the Secretary of State.35   Lord 
Radcliffe was a noted barrister but he attempted to draw the boundary lines based on religious 
and ethnic orientations of the local populaces.  For the Princely states that were being 
“dissected”, in theory the Princes’ decisions on which country to join were to be final decision as 
long as the ethnic majority agreed.  While “other considerations” were also to be included, the 
four weeks the Commissions were given was simply not enough time.36 
      Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the political leader of the Indian Muslim League, and Mahatma 
Gandhi, leader of the Indian National Congress, both thought they had an agreeable and peaceful 
solution.  However, riots between these two religious groups, led by hardline agitators, left over 
one million dead in their destructive wakes.37  Conceived as a means to maintain a peaceful 
coexistence, East and West Pakistan and its Indian counterpart emerged as blood-soaked lands 
whose people feared each other and the others’ religions. 
     Newly created West Pakistan and East Pakistan were not prepared for the massive onslaught 
of religious refugees.38  East Pakistan was situated in proximity to Nepal (to the North) and 
Myanmar (near the South) but surrounded on three sides by India’s far North-Eastern provinces.  
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East Pakistan did not have the space needed for the huge numbers of people fleeing the violence.  
West Pakistan was ruled by an elitist landed class who kept the duo roles of both political and 
economic power.  Vast numbers of refugees in West Pakistan were either placed or chose to stay 
primarily within the eastern cities which were close to the country’s new border.39  West 
Pakistan’s northern and the western regions were the country’s primary agricultural zones and 
remained sparsely populated.  Mimicking the colonial British and reverting to past religious and 
social barriers, both East and West Pakistan maintained plutocratic governments despite the 
outward show of successful and mostly peaceful democratic revolutions.   
    From the beginning, Pakistan saw itself as having been dealt bad cards. The country was seen 
by the International Community as a Third World outcast with little to offer the industrialized 
free world.  After their separation, India retained the vast majority of industrial capabilities with 
Pakistan barely having any at all.40  Pakistan’s government did not have the military means or 
equipment necessary to defend the country from any aggressor including India, China, or the 
USSR.  Despite the prior agreements made by India’s and Pakistan’s government, India did not 
supply Pakistan with the promised military stores.  Once East and West Pakistan split from India 
and after each side killed half a million of the other in religiously inspired riots, India refused 
shipment.  Out of the 300,000 tons of promised munitions, equipment and supplies, only 6,000 
tons of worthless and outdated military scrap items were sent from India by train.41  Pakistan 
desperately needed the military capabilities or it was feared the two countries would again be 
swallowed up into India or taken over by ambitious Chinese or Russian rulers.   
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The Obstinate Fight and Poor Governance 
 
     From the outset, Pakistan’s political and socio-economic systems were bound to fail.  Before 
the 1947 separation, neither Jinnah nor Gandhi could come up with an amenable political plan to 
save India as a whole nation.  Their political alliance was based upon a common foe, the English 
and their aristocratic form of governance.  With both their adversarial politics formed upon 
mainly religious lines, India’s resistance movement began to unravel when members of the 
Muslim league led by Jinnah began demanding their own self-rule and ultimately their own 
country.  Gandhi and his supporters in a very unexpected and unusual move simply acquiesced.  
His Congress Party leadership had been taken over by his supporters who marginalized him.42  
The inability of India’s rival political elites, the Congress Party and the India Muslim League, to 
be able to compromise with one another led to further estrangement of its populace and to the 
civil massacres that followed.  This was the setting stage of a much larger Indian nation 
confronting Pakistan and the creation of Pakistan’s Little Brother Syndrome. 
     The Indian provinces that became East and West Pakistan had a political history consisting of 
what was allowed by the British government.  After World War One, the United Kingdom’s 
powerful empire began to wane and the Indian call for self-rule increased.  Local political control 
was enhanced by the 1919 Government of India Act.43   As a result, what became Pakistan’s 
wealthy landed class and political elites created small city dominions to compete politically. 
Pakistan’s political parties wanted universal suffrage but were denied again when the 1935 
Government of India Act did not grant it. The act only stated it would be granted in the future.  
The 1919 act and the 1935 act were legal decrees which allowed local communities to self-
govern and included provisions for limited self-taxation.  England’s absolute monarchy retained 
its power over its colonial subjects by granting them restricted powers of their own.   For what 
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was to become East and West Pakistan, local elections gave those ambitious enough to seek 
political office as well as political power the ability to do so.44  Political parties and their 
machinery were established on the city level and voting on local matters became an established 
as well as an entrenched societal norm.   
     As a new nation, East and West Pakistan lacked the ability of more well defined nations in the 
cohesiveness of a national identity.  The major tribal and religious based identity groups had no 
pull to self-identify as a Pakistan nation.  The only cohesive nationalism was hatred of India.  
Muslim leaders of the India separation movement saw an opportunity to create a new Muslim 
state but had little to no plans of how to incorporate their ideas into a federal civil service, 
national army, federal controls, or government organizations to support a civil society.  National 
leaders accepted what was known at the time i.e. British colonial practices based on hierarchal 
classes of wealth.  This inability to create self-recognition as a national country has left Pakistan 
reeling from military coups and the inability of civil society to cohesively form strong formal 
democratic supporting infrastructures and ideals. 
     The leadership of this new democracy was formed around the Muslim leadership of the free 
India movement and it lacked the organizational support that Mahatma Gandhi and his protégés 
had.  Jinnah did not have the momentum of thousands of supporters in the new country.  Many 
Muslims decided to stay in India lacking the capability and financial wherewithal to travel to 
either Pakistan.  Those Jinnah followers who did manage to make it to Pakistan did not find the 
welcome they had anticipated.45  Most followers moved to West Pakistan’s major cities along the 
Eastern border and had difficulty finding basic housing and necessities.  Pakistan desperately 
needed massive foreign aid in order to provide for the one million plus Indian refugees.   
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     In addition to the newly arrived refugees, Pakistan’s civil government was based on previous 
political norms established during the British colonial period 1857 to 1947.  British overseers 
made it a habit to disenfranchise local populaces by legal and socially acceptable class 
discrimination based on wealth.  The second method of disenfranchising was the reinforcement 
of ethnic distinctions and mores.  The typical British colonialism model was “Divide and 
Conquer”.46  Having local ethnicities or religious factions fight against each other so they don’t 
all fight against you.  This divide-and-conquer methodology worked exceedingly well within the 
confines of colonial India.  Instead of basing society on acceptance of a complex social order 
consisting of different origins and means, democracy was in name only, and England’s monarch 
ruled the empire. 
     After East and West Pakistan’s independence was granted, Pakistan’s national civil 
government embarked to switch political focus from the city level to the national level.  Created 
akin to the Confederate States of America, the CSA national level was established as a weak 
counterpart to states’ rights advocates who held onto political power.  For Pakistan, the political 
elite saw that true political power lay within cities-states structures versus the national level.  As 
long as they were left alone, these elite power structures run by the land owning upper class were 
content with the current configuration.  Jinnah realized that in order for a national association to 
form between the national state and its peoples, these city structures and local political power 
needed to be tapped into or broken apart.  To his dismay, the local aristocracy, i.e. the wealthy 
landed class, as well as the people, refused to join the national government focus this new nation 
so desperately needed.   
     The link-pin of Pakistan’s Little Brother Syndrome based nationalism is to concentrate focus 
on the military as the hero and savior of the state’s original territorial goal and later as its Islamic 
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defender.  From the outset, political organizations were not given the high admiration that the 
military was.  This was due to the fact Pakistan found itself at war within the first year of its 
creation.  Throughout Pakistan’s history, when political organizations banded together to 
confront national problems, the necessity of countering India’s military capabilities took 
precedence as well as most of the available national budget.  If a political party like the Pakistani 
Peoples Party which had national appeal takes hold, the military would step in and take control 
of the nation.  Political corruption was and is rampant in Pakistan and the voting system is no 
stranger to it as well.47  As the former President Pervez Musharraf says in his book In the Line Of 
Fire,  
“Sadly, a functioning democracy is exactly what has eluded Pakistan since its birth on  
  August 14, 1947.”48  
 
He credits,  
 “rule by a small elite – never democratic, often autocratic, usually plutocratic, and lately  
   kleptocratic—all working with a tribal-feudal mindset”39 
 
In short, the Pakistani military, and specifically, the Pakistani army has often seized national 
control when a political power vacuum is created or a national protest occurs and turns violent.  
The army replaces civilian rule with its own leadership.  Co-editors Myron Weiner and Ali 
Banuzaiai researched why this keeps occurring in The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: 
Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan.  They wrote: 
“Of Pakistan’s institutions, one, the military, has remained untouched.  It was too 
powerful for civilians to tamper with and virtually ran itself without outside interference.  
Only when it was defeated by the Indian Army in 1971 were there attempts by Bhutto to 
restructure it, and some of these attempts may have only hastened his own downfall.”50  
 
The link-pin of Pakistan’s Little Brother Syndrome relies upon the military to counter any 
potential threat to Pakistan.  If that threat were diminished, then the Army would lose its status as 
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Pakistan’s Islamic faith defender.  Consequently, any new Indian weapons capability has to be 
matched by Pakistan’s military establishment. 
     In its beginning, Pakistan was enduring its early consolidation efforts but barely a year had 
passed before war was declared in 1948.  Despite gaining significant ground in the disputed 
Jammu and Kashmir territories, the war was seen as a defeat for Pakistan but not for its military.  
While the military was given broad public support after the war, the civilian government fared 
far worse.  Even before partition, the Muslim League which was Pakistan’s staunch supporter 
saw its popular support crumble into nothingness during the 1937 Indian elections.51  After 
partition and Pakistan’s first conflict, it was the civil government that began losing public 
support.  Like the Confederacy in the 1860’s, the Muslim League nationalists were caught in a 
cauldron of states’ rights (albeit for Pakistan city-state) advocates.  Nationalists were overruled, 
overlooked, and disregarded by the voting supporters of their own political creationist, the 
Muslim League.  Civil authorities were blamed for the failures of the war goal as well as the civil 
unrest created by the lack of adequate housing, the high cost of food and the scarcity of 
employment.  As noted by author Mr. Keith Callard, 
“There were floods, corruption, inefficiency and poverty, and there was no kingdom of  
heaven on earth.  And Government, as always, was to blame. “52   
 
The inability of the Muslim League to connect with Pakistan’s voters on national level issues 
was the foothold needed by Little Brother Syndrome to start its precedence. 
     In retrospect, the use of the military to bolster Pakistani nationalism was a huge mistake by 
Jinnah.  Instead of tying the average citizen to his or her federal government, the political ties the 
populace felt for the country and its civilian government leaders became estranged.  Like the 
American South who forever praised General Robert E. Lee while cursing President Jefferson 
Davis, Pakistani’s praised their military generals and blamed the national government for its 
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inabilities to effectively operate.  After the war, the popular support for the average soldier still 
remained high while civil government political leaders, both federal and local, support dropped 
considerably.  Muhammad Ali Jinnah passed away 11 September 1948 before Pakistan’s first 
war was officially over.   
“But he was ageing, sick and tired, and soon he was dead.  And the party that he had built  
began to disintegrate.”53   
 
The Little Brother Syndrome had its foundation firmly set within the first years of Pakistan’s 
creation.  
Little Brother and Moral Righteousness 
The Fight for Jammu and Kashmir 
 
     After Partition, the Punjab Boundary Commission’s unfinished work left the princely states of 
Jammu and Kashmir undecided and hotly disputed by Pakistan.  With both provinces having 
Muslim majority populations, Pakistan’s first attempt was to secure a favorable solution to the 
Jammu and Kashmir dispute through state diplomacy.  As newly created “small” independent 
states, Pakistan originally sought the assistance of the international community in order to 
overcome the social, religious and territorial injustice(s) it believed Britain and India caused.  
Pakistan’s civil government was hoping the United Nations would come to its aid and force India 
to recognize Pakistan’s legitimate rights to the disputed regions.  As a poor nation, Pakistan was 
unprepared for a major tactical war with India.  Pakistan’s government chose to pin its hopes on 
the never tested United Nations’ ability to solve territorial conflicts.  Growing tired and impatient 
with India continually blocking UN bureaucratic actions, however, Pakistan’s government chose 
to use asymmetric warfare as its means of gaining what it considered as its legitimate territory. 
The competitive fight was on and Little Brother’s moral cause and national goal to free its fellow 
Muslims from Indian rule was firmly and formally established.      
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     The Pakistani people were primarily questioning British intentions and if Britain was not 
unfairly favoring India.   The last British Viceroy of India was Lord Mountbatten the former 
W.W. II commander of England’s South-East Asia command.  "Although Mountbatten finally 
agreed on (establishing) Pakistan to please Jinnah, he still insisted that it made no sense at all."54  
Pakistanis also questioned why the boundary commissions split the Muslim Punjab and Bengal 
provinces with only half the territories declared part of Pakistan.55  Pakistani leadership 
attributed the territorial advantages accruing to India at the time of partition to Hindu perfidy and 
what they called "the pernicious anti-Pakistani collusion between Lord Mountbatten and the first 
Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru".56     
     The continual on and off use of limited military force by a smaller nation against a much 
larger nation has its roots in the Little Brother Syndrome.  My analysis contains the idea that a 
little brother when opposed to the controlling force of a larger, older sibling will fight to achieve 
or at least defy the status of that “rival” sibling.  The older sibling is “recognized” by the parent 
or parents as being more mature and of greater understanding than the younger or the youngest 
sibling of the nuclear family.  The older sibling is given more responsibility and authority to 
watch over the younger regardless of the ages separating the children.  The problem lies in the 
fact the larger and older children may not have the mental techniques necessary to “rule over” 
the younger siblings but are given that authority by the parents anyway.  What may have started 
out as a friendly role of simple family adjustments often turns toward hostility to coerce the 
younger children into line.57  This Little Brother Syndrome dynamic is what fuels the intense 
hatred and animosity between India and Pakistan. 
     In October 1947, this first major conflict between the two antagonists locked the combat 
method used into future conflicts and established a continuing ‘Little Brother Syndrome rivalry’.  
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Pakistan, lacking competent arms and material for a traditional army, called upon religious 
fighters from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of the North-West Frontier 
territories.  Pakistan used these traditional tribal nomads as an operational and military deception 
“shield” for its first offensive movement in the disputed Jammu and Kashmir provinces.  The 
five thousand combatants were given six weeks of army training and placed under army 
commanders for the operation.58  “On 23 October 1947, some 5,000 Pashtun tribesmen – Afridi, 
Waziri, and Mahsud from the NWFP – crossed the border into Kashmir, carried by Pakistan 
army vehicles.”59  The tribesmen covertly invaded Kashmir in an attempt to claim the non-
aligned territory for Pakistan.  The deception plan was to disguise these recruits as J&K citizens 
who started a voluntary civilian revolt against the Indian federal government.  Pakistan’s 
religious militia however blundered into existence.  The men resorted into mobs that began 
ransacking and looting the Indian towns they were sent into to start a popular uprising.60  The 
J&K Maharaja fearing loss of his power requested Indian military support.  He received India’s 
help but he also had to sign over his government’s ruling authority for defense, communications, 
and foreign affairs.61  Without the towns’ public support for Pakistan, India was able to rally its 
paramilitary and military forces to combat the irregular foreign militia.   
     On 1 January 1948, India’s state department formally filed its grievance with the United 
Nations.62  There were three United Nations resolutions.  U.N. Resolution 39, passed in 20 
January1948 established a three panel commission to report to the U.N. Council on the best 
course of action to further peaceful relations.  U.N. Resolution 47, passed in 21 April 1948, 
called on both parties to remove their military personnel and establish a plebiscite for the entire 
Jammu and Kashmir provinces.  The third part of the resolution called for a general election so a 
deciding vote to join Pakistan or India could be taken.  Neither side removed their military forces 
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entirely from the disputed regions.  In January 1949, the United Nations called for a cease-fire 
and Pakistan eagerly agreed.  The two sides stopped their warfare on January 1st, 1949 and later 
in July, the United Nations’ cease-fire line was established.63  In 1951, U.N. Resolution 91 sent 
in U.N. military observers to observe and report any violations of the ceasefire agreement along 
the established line of control.  Pakistan’s liberation effort resulted in obtaining little over a third 
of J&K territory but also the international community’s condemnation of Pakistan’s 
Machiavellian means.  
          For Pakistan, the war’s outcome was seen by its population as a militarily strategic and 
tactical defeat.  Originally, Pakistan’s newspapers, radio stations and government television 
services all shared in the responsibility for the public support of its military forces.  As with the 
South in the American Civil War, Pakistan’s military forces were believed to possess great 
physical and mental attributes.  Newspapers published articles saying how Pakistan’s military 
members were better than their foes and how “one Pakistani jawan (soldier) was worth seven 
Indian jawans”.64  As with the Southern campaigns in the early part of the American Civil War, 
Pakistan’s early battlefield successes were eventually stopped and the war became a stalemate.       
      To complicate matters, the commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army was British General 
Gracy.  On the Indian Army's intervention in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Quaid-e-
Azam reacted swiftly and ordered General Gracy, (acting Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan 
Army) on 27/28 October 1947 to dispatch troops to the scene.  The British General, however, 
failed to carry out the orders of the Governor General.  It might be said that, in the 
circumstances, he blatantly defied the Quaid.  Some people thought it was a case of high treason. 
At that time all the four provincial Governors, the Agent to the Governor General in Baluchistan 
and the three Services Chiefs of Pakistan were British. To help maintain order, British officers 
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were kept in charge of India’s and Pakistan’s militaries during and after partition.   As the 
governor-general of Pakistan, Jinnah ordered the deployment of regular Pakistani troops in 
support of the tribal invaders.65  Pakistan’s British commander-in-chief refused the order and 
instructed his English officers not to assist.  The native army elements responded but had been 
greatly delayed in trying to restart the eastern offensive.  With critical time lost, the war ended 
with little territorial gains having been made.   India’s larger military was able to contain 
Pakistan’s military actions.  A little over a third of the Kashmir territory was seized but 
Pakistan’s popular support for the imaginative capabilities of its forces as well as the war itself 
met the reality of India’s pure numerical strength.  While the U.N. agreement called for a civil 
referendum or plebiscite allowing the citizens of J&K provinces to vote and decide which nation 
to align themselves with, this vote has never taken place. 
     From the war, Pakistan’s early leadership learned of the value of independent forces free of 
European constraints or restrictions and chose to keep these covert assets.  Pakistan leadership 
saw no wrong in using whatever resources it had to take the Jammu and Kashmir provinces.  The 
Federally Administrated Tribal Areas and North West Frontier Province (now called Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa66) irregular militia tribesmen had been sent into the Jammu and Kashmir provinces 
to start ‘local insurgencies’ in favor of the provinces joining Pakistan.  On a grander scale, this 
was repeated in the 1965 India-Pakistan War.  In 1965, India was taking the constitutional legal 
steps to declare the disputed J&K provinces as its own.  Pakistan again tried to influence the 
international community for support but failed.  Seeing no other recourse, Pakistan introduced 
both irregular/militia tribesmen it had trained in great numbers along with its professional 
soldiers who were wearing civilian clothing.  During the 1999 siege of the Siachen Glacier called 
the Kargill Conflict, Pakistan claimed the original occupiers were not its soldiers, but again, local 
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tribesmen trying to reclaim land lost in the 1947 partition.  Whenever an incident occurs inside 
India’s Jammu and Kashmir provinces, Pakistan’s leadership claims no government knowledge 
and implies the conflict is the result of Indian separatists. 
     Historically, the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas or FATA is a legally declared Pakistan 
land area watched over by a Political Agent who reports directly to Pakistan’s President.  The 
agent’s job is to administer one of the seven areas using the 1901 Frontier Crimes Regulations 
established under British rule.  The agent polices the local populaces by the use of regular 
Pakistan military troops and the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force of irregular tribal members 
whose officers are Pakistan army officers.67  The mountainous Pashtun tribal clans that inhabit 
these seven tribal areas and three frontier regions are granted limited Pakistani citizenship, they 
are rarely if ever given Pakistan passports, and live in an area where the rule of law is vastly 
different than those living outside FATA boundaries.68  The tribal clans have no established civil 
court system and cannot file legal grievances against the federal system.  Legal grievances can 
only be filed against the Agent who has sole responsible for making the final ruling.  The only 
recourse is the use of communal Sharia law in which the head of the tribal clan may decide what 
to do but only for internal clan disputes.  Schools in the NWFP are limited, the teachers are 
under-educated themselves, and religious schools called Madrasa are the primary education 
providers.69  This in an area with only a seven percent literacy rate.70  The clans do have limited 
political representation in Pakistan’s Senate and the National Assembly.  Universal suffrage was 
finally granted in 1996 but political parties were not allowed to participate in the general 
elections until 2012.71  As a result, the FATA is a prime recruiting area among a closed 
disenfranchised populace and provides the best covert training grounds for Pakistani state 
supported terrorist efforts to reclaim the J&K provinces. 
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      Despite multiple wars, the Jammu and Kashmir provinces remain largely Indian.72  Many in 
the International Community believed its Muslim population wanted to be part of West Pakistan.  
Despite continued efforts by Pakistan to have the United Nations resolutions regarding these two 
provinces fulfilled, the United Nations has refused to open the debates or carry out the 
resolutions either with force or negotiations. In the international debate on how India and 
Pakistan are to resolve this issue, Pakistan emerged as the little brother to the much larger and 
better established India.   
From Diplomacy to State Supported Terrorism 
Little Brother and the Use of Uncivil Behavior 
 
     Pakistan’s early civilian and later military governments sought asymmetrical warfare to 
bridge their initial capabilities gap with India.  Superior in personnel numbers and military 
assets, India had no political or military reason to give up the Jammu and Kashmir provinces.  
What started as a political dispute soon rose to a military territorial challenge which has since 
transformed into a constant terrorist threat to the Indian towns that bordered the disputed areas.  
Pakistan’s military leaders turned to long term terrorism to wear down India’s armed services, its 
provincial and federal police directorates and later its paramilitary police forces.  While denying 
their active support for terrorism, Pakistani leaders believed a terrorism based campaign would 
eventually cause India’s territorial capitulation.73  As the little brother in this sibling rivalry, 
Pakistan seeks and uses any method available to win the competitive fight. 
     Pakistan’s use of terrorism as a state function is not unprecedented and neither is the 
International Community’s response which was to overlook this state aspect in order to further 
its own goals.  In his 1969 book The Myth of Independence, Zulfikar Bhutto described how the 
United States wanted Pakistan to forego its territorial dispute with India and accept Indian 
regional hegemony.74  Instead of resolving Pakistan’s territorial dispute, Pakistan’s leadership 
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ignored the U.S. request.  Any acceptance or public show of wanting to end this Little Brother 
Syndrome rivalry would be seen as a sign of weakness in the eyes of the polity.  Settling the 
issue without achieving the country’s religious goal to free Jammu and Kashmir would also end   
Pakistan’s core reason for its existence.  In the eyes of Little Brother Syndrome, accepting 
India’s position would terminate Pakistan’s own reason to exist.   
     After the 1971 separation of East Pakistan, the next major international crisis making Pakistan 
an important American ally again was the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  The United 
States intervened in an attempt to turn Russia’s invasion into “The Soviets’ Vietnam”.75  As a 
result, the United States military and financial aid was indirectly supporting Pakistan’s own 
Jammu and Kashmiri terrorist groups.  The Soviet war began December 1979 and lasted to 
February 1989.  In 1985 alone, the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency spent $250 
million dollars to help defeat Communist Russian and Afghanistan forces.76  When the Soviets 
pulled out in 1989, an internal civil war raged between the different sects and religious fighters 
who conducted the ground war.  Pakistan, seeing an opportunity to create a state friendly to its 
Islamic principles supported the Taliban with ammunition, fuel, supplies, and training.77   
     One of Pakistan’s state support terrorist groups that was being monitored by the Central 
Intelligence Agency was the Kashmiri group Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA).78  The group was 
founded by Abdelkader Mokhtari in 1993.  The CIA found that HUA was being actively 
supported by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) department along with numerous 
Taliban units.  The HUA were also being instructed at Taliban training camps in both Pakistan 
and in Afghanistan.79  When, Kabul, now Capitol of Afghanistan fell to the Taliban forces in late 
1996, this freed up additional personnel to be used elsewhere such as Bosnia or Jammu and 
Kashmir.  The CIA noted in a Top Secret National Intelligence Daily dated 30 September 1996 
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that “HUA contacts of Embassy New Delhi have hinted that “they might undertake terrorist 
actions against civilian airliners.”80  Despite repeated U.S. demands for Pakistan to stop 
supporting the Taliban in the 1990’s, the strategic value of the Taliban and other groups like it 
such as the HUA was more than enough reason not to do so.  The United States, a top leader of 
the International Community, was unable to get Pakistan’s cooperation.  Under Little Brother 
Syndrome, the Pakistani government continued supporting terrorism and doing so by using 
United States’ funds to accomplish its goals. 
     Pakistan has an operational advantage keeping terrorists within its own borders and 
encouraging their illegal war against India.  Pakistan’s civil authorities can claim they have no 
knowledge of terrorist activities while the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence as well as regular 
military instructors train and equip terrorist group members.  The knowledge of these covert state 
activities can be kept to a very limited number of higher level government personnel.  When 
terrorist actions do occur, leaders can provide plausible deniability; i.e., the appearance of 
innocence when city, regional, national, or even international press question them.   
     Since 1970, India has had six thousand, five hundred and forty two terrorist incidents.  Of 
these, approximately 2,131 have occurred in the Jammu and Kashmir provinces.81  Authors Chris 
Demchak and Eric Werner’s Exploring the Knowledge Nexus: India’s Path in Terrorism-
Driven Institutional Growth details how India was able to manage an explosion of terrorist 
organizational growth in the 1980’s.82  After a large increase in the number of deaths attributable 
to terrorist attacks, Indian state governments made the decision to band counter-terrorism units 
together and create their own separate agency called “Anti-Terrorist Squads”.83  The paramilitary 
squads were somewhat successful, so in 1986 India’s federal government created a new federal 
counterpart called National Security Guards.   
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     According to Demchak and Werner, until 1989 the number of terrorists caught who were not 
from Jammu and Kashmir region, was one in eight.84  After 1989, which was the year the Soviets 
withdrew from Afghanistan, eight out of 10 terrorist members caught in Jammu and Kashmir 
were foreigner fighters.  Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency covertly assisted 
mujahedeen members making their way into Kashmir.  The mujahedeen fighters began a terror 
campaign to force out the minority Hindu population.  The number of car bombings, political 
and ethnic assignations, violent based intimidations, terror propaganda, and arsons all increased 
substantially.  The Indian Muslim population that was native to the area also came under attack 
and contributed to the Kashmir emigration.  In total, over 200,000 civilians left Kashmir to 
escape the religious and ethnic violence.85  
          While India was partly successful, the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 caught the 
United States off-guard and the resulting American deaths rallied the nation to declare war on 
Afghanistan’s Al-Qaeda faction and its use of terrorism.  Pakistan’s President Musharraf was 
called by Secretary of State Colin Powel and told he and Pakistan would join the war against 
terrorism and Al Qaeda,  “You are either with us or against us“.86  The United States promised a 
robust economic assistance package that included finalizing the previous 1990 freeze on F-16 
fighter aircraft and millions in humanitarian assistance.87  Despite years of intelligence reporting 
stating that HUA and other Kashmiri groups were supporting and being supported by the 
Taliban, the United States sent massive funding to Pakistan.88 
     A prime example of how LBS came into the next international crisis is the Frontier Corps.  
Central Intelligence Agency operatives described how Pakistani Frontier Corps elements were 
utilized in command and control; training, and when necessary combat right beside the Taliban 
in Afghanistan.89  Comprised mostly of Pashtuns, the Frontier Corp members were “preferred 
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over the regular Pakistan army forces because the army is predominantly Punjabi who have 
different features as compared to the Pashtun and other Afghan tribes.”90  Pakistan denied any 
connection and the Taliban denied they were sheltering HUA militants.91  The Frontier Corps 
were also responsible for providing combat training in Kandahar or Herat for the Pakistani 
madrassa students who were being sent to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban.92  As Pakistan’s 
relationship with the United States soured over Taliban support, the U.S. Ambassador Thomas 
Simons confronted an Afghanistan “official” (name excised in the declassified cable) that what 
Pakistan provides is “wheat, POL (Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants), and busses full of 
adolescent Mujahid crossing the frontier shouting ‘Allahu Akbar’ and going into the line with a 
day or two of weapons training.”93  In September 2000, the U.S. Secretary of State urged the 
Government of Pakistan to cease all military and financial support to the Taliban.  Internal State 
Department communications were claiming “Pakistani support for the Taliban has been long-
standing, the magnitude of recent support is unprecedented.”94 
     After September 11, 2001, Pakistan again received U.S. military and humanitarian support 
but this time to fight a common enemy; terrorism.  Announced in an April 2009 press release, 
President O’Bama’s $83.4 billion dollar war funding request included “$400 million for the new 
Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund which would allow Central Command (author’s 
note U.S. Military) to provide training and equipment to build the counterinsurgency capability 
of Pakistan’s military, Frontier Corps, and irregular security forces.”95  Associated with  
Pakistan’s formerly state supported Kashmir terrorist groups Lashkar-e Toiba (formed 1990), 
Harakat ul-Ansar (formed 1993), and Jaish-e Mohammed (formed 1994)96, the Inter-Services 
Intelligence Division, the Frontier Corps, and its irregular security forces became Pakistan’s 
counterinsurgency forces.  Little Brother Syndrome strikes again. 
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Family Ties & Hegemonic International Politics 
        Realizing the U.K. did not have its interest at heart and in order to protect it’s newly won 
international boundaries, Pakistan originally turned to the United States to guarantee its 
continued existence.  Pakistan’s elite realized from the beginning that in order to remain free, it 
needed a first tier and world recognized supporting ally.  As the Cold War between the U.S.S.R. 
and the U.S. developed, Pakistan’s geographic location became its greatest asset.  From the 
1950’s on, by allowing the United States military to establish bases and outfit them with short 
and medium range nuclear missiles within the country, both civil and military aid was 
generously given.  This allowed Pakistan to build a worthy military with a capability to 
adequately defend against a larger neighbor.  By having its supporter’s military within the 
country, the enemy that risked crossing Pakistan’s borders also risked having the United States 
intercede on Pakistan’s behalf.  Seeing these benefits, Pakistan’s government willfully and 
successfully supported the United States in a variety of international government functions. 
     In 1954, Pakistan signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States.97    
In the 1950’s and 1960’s, the United States used West Pakistan’s military airfields to covertly 
launch secret U-2 recognizant flights which could photograph and monitor the Communist 
nuclear missile fields in the Soviets’ western regions.98  The United States also maintained 
classified intelligence gathering equipment at Peshawar Air Station.99  (The 1979 Iranian 
Revolution later forced the U.S. to expand Pakistan’s own electronic intercept capabilities. 
100) From 1954 to 1965, as long as Pakistan’s government leaders allowed the United States 
military to freely function within its borders, Pakistan received continuing and copious Western 
foreign aid. 
     This strategy of allowing the United States to place intelligence infrastructure within Pakistan 
was based on military necessity for a hegemonic alliance with a strong world super-power.  In 
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1954, Pakistan joined the U.S. sponsored South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) that 
was created to stop Communist China’s expansion.101  The 1955 Baghdad Pact (later renamed 
CENTO in 1958) was also signed by Pakistan.  The agreement was designed to stop communist 
USSR expansionism into the Middle East.  Seeing the help it could receive from allying itself 
with the United States, Pakistan signed a new bi-lateral Agreement of Cooperation.  As Ahmad 
Faruqui writes in his Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan, the country became the 
United States’ “most allied ally in Asia”.102 
     From Fiscal Year 1950 until Fiscal Year 2001, Pakistan received a grand total of $3.6 billion 
dollars (in 2006 U.S. currency values) of foreign military sales and military aid from the United 
States.103  In 1954 the United States Congress authorized the joint Mutual Defense Assistance 
Agreement.104  The treaty purpose was to train Pakistani military officers and enlisted on the 
warfare techniques and the advanced equipment used by American military units.105  Pakistani 
officers were also taught how American Army war planners grouped joint operations together to 
ensure their plans’ success.  Pakistani military personnel received tactical and strategic training 
on the advanced American equipment including tanks and fighter aircraft.  The United States 
helped East and West Pakistan while the larger and older India, as a former colony, was created 
and later continued to be supported by the United Kingdom.  For South Asia, there was United 
States Dad, an English Mother, an older Indian brother, various brothers and sisters consisting of 
the former English colonies, and little brother Pakistan.  The only fragile force holding this 
dysfunctional family together was its own hegemonic family ties. 
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Little Brother Versus Big Brother Militarily 
 
     Little Brothers’ competitive drive makes them want what the older sibling’s already enjoy 
from their parent(s), recognition and to be seen as equals.  Forcing the older sibling for this 
recognition is within the Little Brother Syndrome competitive spirit.  Younger siblings may well 
create or be having a feud the older sibling may not even identify or realize.  For example, 
Pakistan and India have fought four major wars, countless skirmishes and undeclared terrorist 
actions mostly to the detriment of Pakistan.  Can the Little Brother Syndrome explain why 
Pakistan continually uses it budget consuming military to achieve the perceived vindication of its 
goal when the risk is so high? 
     A historical perspective will help alleviate the question as to why Pakistan sees it military 
capabilities superior to much larger India.  The provinces of Jammu, Kashmir, Punjab, and Sindh 
have an enduring historical legacy of supplying fierce and rugged individuals suited for Brittan’s 
Colonial India’s military needs.106  During World War One, from these provinces Great Britain 
actively recruited approximately 500 thousand men into its colonial armies.  During World War 
II, two million Indian men served with over 650 thousand men coming from this area of India.107  
When East and West Pakistan were created in 1947, Pakistani Muslim and Sikh men already had 
a well-established historical fighting culture.  Pakistan’s government perceived this image as a 
tremendous advantage against their Indian foes. 
    The first Jammu and Kashmir clash may have been inconclusive but Pakistan did manage to 
take at least some of the territory it sought and did so without the military wherewithal needed 
for an extended fight.  If former solders could succeed as well as they did this first time, what 
would happen if equipped with proper military arms and support?  The line-of-control that was 
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established by U.N. negotiations gave Pakistan some recognition internationally despite its 
negative connotations.      
     India and Pakistan’s second major military conflict occurred in 1965 and was a close repeat of 
the stalemated 1947 war but on a much larger scale.  Pakistan’s strategy was to again covertly 
send in tribal warriors and professional troops disguised as Kashmiri civilians to start local 
rebellions against the Indian provincial governments.  Instead of a couple thousand, in August 
1965, some 7,000 troops were sent across the border to take up positions for the planned 
uprisings.108  India soon learned the presence of these troops and after securing her western 
positions drove armored columns into the high Pakistani held Kashmir Mountains and captured 
Haji Pir pass.  Pakistan counterattacked with a numerically superior number of tanks and 
personnel.  Using tactics similar to the 1962 Chinese military incursions against India, ground 
and armored units raced eastward and recaptured the pass.  A second stalemate ensued until India 
reorganized, regrouped, and reinforced its front line forces with new supplies, equipment and 
men.  On 6 September 1965, India crossed the international border further south in the Kashmir 
range with early success.  The Indian southern offensive began driving towards Islamabad and 
Lahore.  India had correctly assessed Pakistan may try the same tactics as the Chinese and 
responded quickly with numerous air assaults in the North and in the south with heavy tank 
battalions.  When the United Nations quickly offered a cease fire agreement, both sides readily 
agreed. 
     The irony in this second major engagement of two professional militaries is the fact both sides 
again were equally equipped with primarily United States and United Kingdom military 
equipment.  Pakistani forces were relying upon American Patton tanks and F-86 “Saber” aircraft 
purchased under U.S. Foreign Military Sales contracts.  The Indians relied upon British 
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Centurion heavy tanks and aircraft and also utilized Soviet heavy artillery.  Why Pakistan 
generals believed the same military deception tactic would work a second time (as well as in 
future conflicts109) is unknown.  Could it be they felt what is termed the “Cinderella” effect?  I.E. 
winning an unachievable goal when everyone including the other team doubts your abilities?  
With both sides using roughly the same military hardware, India’s numeric advantage again 
played a decisive role.  The total number of military personnel engaged in combat was greater 
but the same premise(s) led to the same and familiar conclusion.  While Pakistan’s Air Force 
could claim a better air combat performance than India’s, the international community including 
the United States condemned Pakistani political leaders for causing the war. 
     While the number of Pakistani troop losses was greater than India’s, Pakistan’s Air Force 
could claim victory by the number of Indian aircraft that were downed.  Pakistani pilots asserted 
superior tactics and procedures were used to destroy India’s fighter aircraft.  In an interview with 
a British reporter, a Pakistan Air Force pilot credited better equipment and skills for the reprieve 
of the 5 to 1 advantage India had.110  This bravado statement is a method US Air Force and Navy 
training squadron instructors’ use when teaching new fighter pilots.  The Pakistani F-86 
squadron pilots received similar training as part of Pakistan’s purchase of these American 
fighters.111  This American training reinforced Pakistan’s Little Brother Syndrome.  USAF 
training instructors emphasize the need for extremely aggressive competitiveness and always 
striving for the combat pilot to overcome whatever situation he is in and win the engagement.  
This was nothing new for training military pilots.  However, the problem it created was the 
favored prominence given to Pakistan’s military.  Ayub Khan’s dictatorial reign was seen as 
being the only legitimate solution for Pakistan’s internal struggles.  The U.S. training buttressed 
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military competitiveness and mutually strengthened Pakistan’s Little Brother Syndrome 
embodied in the psyche of its military as well as its political leaders. 
     Again, the international community condemned Pakistani actions and the United States 
formally declared no foreign military sales would be allowed for either combatant country.  This 
dramatic U.S. foreign policy shift was seen by Pakistan society as an additional reason to end 
their hegemonic reliance upon the United States.  China’s perceived win in the 1962 Sino-Indian 
conflict112 and its nuclear weapon explosion in 1964113 opened Pakistani eyes to the possibility of 
another ally against India.  As a result, Pakistan began building mutual ties with Communist 
China.114  Chinese tanks began appearing in Pakistani Army tank companies right beside their 
American Patton tank counterparts.  Pakistan also purchased Chinese artillery and began officer 
exchange programs with China to make up for the loss of American equipment, supplies and 
training.115  During this period, the tactic worked and the military services were fortified.  The 
problem was Pakistan’s military had non-interchangeable parts and stores that were not 
uniformly standardized.  As political tensions between East and West Pakistan began 
intensifying, Pakistan’s military competitiveness was about to be tested not initially from India 
but internally instead. 
     Pakistan’s obsession with Little Brother Syndrome also led to the neglect of accountability 
and governance which created greater fissure between military dominated Pakistan’s federal 
government and its Eastern wing.  The creation of split East and West Pakistan had immediately 
placed the country at peril with India.  The two states of Pakistan were more than 1,000 
miles/1,600 km apart and any military or commercial flight had to fly over either China to avoid 
Indian airspace or India itself.  East Pakistan was also surrounded by India on three sides with 
the Southern border facing the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.  Militarily, East Pakistan 
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had to counter a much larger sized Indian army stationed near the borders which could attack 
from any side.  East Pakistan could not rely upon West Pakistan to fly in troops and supplies or 
use ground maneuvers for resupply if war against India was declared.   
     East Pakistanis also resented the minimal support received from the federal parliament for 
civil and economic improvements projects.  East Pakistanis believed the federal government was 
far too narrowly focused on claiming Jammu and Kashmir.  Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, 
co-editors of, “The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan” states 
Bengalis were, “underrepresented in the military and complained bitterly that their own 
relatively underdeveloped economy was being exploited by West Pakistani firms.”116  The 
combined country’s federal budgets given to civil governance and economic improvements were 
much smaller than the military’s.  The civil infrastructure budgets were primarily spent on West 
Pakistan and rarely within East Pakistan.117 
     The following months brought a series of cataclysmic events which resulted in East Pakistan 
gaining its independence.  Facing ill health, mounting internal political dissatisfaction with riots, 
and losing support of long-time military backers, on 25 March 1969, Ayub Khan turned over his 
dictatorial presidency to Army Chief General Mohammed Yahya Khan.118  Knowing of 
Pakistan’s connections with China, on 25 October 1970, President Richard Nixon offered a one-
time exception to the United States FMS ban on military equipment for Pakistan.  Included in the 
offer was permission for “Pakistan to procure about $50 million worth of replacement aircraft 
and some three hundred armored personnel carriers.”119 Yahya Khan agreed but before delivery 
could be received, Pakistan’s 7 December 1970 elections began a showdown between East and 
West Pakistan.    
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     Neglected politically and treated with indifference, civil politics had created the Awami 
Movement for greater East Pakistan autonomy.120  Supported by both Hindu and Muslim voters, 
the Awami League movement gained widespread grass-roots based popular political support.  In 
the December 1970 elections, the Awami League won a staggering 160 of the possible 162 seats 
based on their total population.  These 160 seats out of Parliament’s 300 seat total gave them a 
clear Parliamentary majority.  West Pakistan’s ‘divide and rule’ mantra had failed.  The Awami 
League’s leader, Mujib-ur-Rahman was demanding greater say for East Pakistan.121  Hardliners 
of the Awami League credited their sweeping victory as a call for complete independence.  The 
Pakistan People’s Party of West Pakistan won 81 Parliamentary seats and its leader, Zulfikar 
Bhutto, the then  Prime Minister wanted a joint co-leadership position with the new Awami 
League’s Mujib-ur-Rahman to keep the country whole.  To force Awami League’s agreement, 
Prime Minister Bhutto refused to allow party members to take their parliamentary seats.  
President Yahya Khan began sending additional army ground troops with the idea of suppressing 
a rebellion.122  With neither side willing to budge, President Yahya Khan held meetings in 
Dacca, East Pakistan starting 15 March 1971 to resolve this constitutional issue.123  
     Two outside factors worsened the relations between East and West Pakistan.  The first was 
the tsunami and its tidal wave that hit East Pakistan the previous December.  Killing over 
200,000 East Pakistanis, West Pakistan did not send any aid until the International Community 
responded.124  The second event occurred during “Pakistan Day” held 23 March each year.  
Instead of flying the Pakistani flag, the Awami League members as a mass political protest 
displayed Bangladesh’s provincial flags throughout Dacca.  Two days later, Yahya Khan left 
East Pakistan and the following day, the Army began a viciously brutal crackdown.125 
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       The sharp but short India-Pakistan 1971 war demonstrated the International Community’s 
Realist beliefs.  Amidst escalating civil war and tensions with India, Pakistan believed the United 
States would come to its aid joining the battle.  They also believed China would assist them if 
India and Russia expanded their operations.  Unlike previous encounters, the United States and 
the Soviets had interceded both politically and militarily.  From the beginning of hostilities, the 
Soviets were helping India.  In August 1971, India and the Soviet Union signed the Indo-Soviet 
Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation stating each side would consult with the other if 
attacked by a third party.126  Russia, seeing an ally who could intercede on their behalf if China 
invaded the U.S.S.R. sent military advisors.  The Russians also helped man the advanced radar 
and other equipment India had purchased after the 1965 American arms embargo.  Russia also 
sent several large naval vessels that were ready to monitor the American carrier task force Nixon 
had ordered into the Indian Ocean.  The Russian fleet began shadow operations raising Cold War 
anxieties.127  Diplomatic efforts increased significantly as foreign political tensions were turning 
this regional conflict into a certified International crisis.  Neither the United States nor China 
chose to assist Pakistan.  With no International Community support and feeling betrayed, 
Pakistan formally surrendered East Pakistan and the nation of Bangladesh was created on         
16 December 1971.128   
     The Shimla Agreement between Pakistan and India was reached in July 1972.129  Both sides 
agreed to exchange their prisoners as well as to withdraw their troops to the international 
boundaries in Punjab and Sindh.  Previous contestations regarding where the line of control 
actually resided in Kashmir were also settled.130  The defeat of Pakistani forces was a huge 
embarrassment.  The Simla Agreement held Pakistan to resolving not just the war’s end but any 
future inter-state dispute was to be settled by direct negotiations, bilaterally.  In addition, under 
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the agreement, all the outstanding disputes Little Brother had with India were ended with Prime 
Minister Zulfiqar Bhutto’s signature.131 
     India’s conviction that Little Brother would be deterred from any future military actions was 
badly ill advised.  India’s leaders turned their attention towards China and its nuclear capabilities 
demonstrated in their 1964 atomic blast.  Pakistan’s leaders refuted their military loss and began 
their quest to counter India’s nuclear ambitions.  As demonstrated by both the United States and 
by its close ally China, Pakistan could not rely upon any of the major world powers to guarantee 
its existence.  Pakistan would have to build its own nuclear capabilities if it was ever going to be 
able to counter India’s atomic threats.  Little Brother was unwilling to accept the status quo and 
aimed to be recognized by the International Community for his abilities despite what anyone else 
said. 
     The next military interaction with India occurred only after Pakistan had demonstrated its 
own atomic warheads.  Pakistan’s 1999 Kargil conflict was a return to previous standard 
operating procedures but with the added threat of nuclear weapons.  Covert religious fighters and 
Pakistan army commandos seized Kargil Heights before Indian troops reoccupied the positions 
in the spring.  The twist in this scenario was the fact each combatant possessed nuclear weapons.  
In 1974 India exploded a nuclear device claiming not a weapon but a test.132   In 1998, India 
exploded more nuclear weapons and Pakistan reciprocated using multiple warheads.133  With 
both sides having nuclear deterrents, Pakistan did not stop its use of terrorism nor limited 
military engagements.  President Musharraf, claiming them as religious fighters and not 
professional troops, declared the action was the result of independent actors.  Indian troops were 
rushed to the area and began retaking the heights by force.  When the presence of Pakistani 
commandos became known, Musharraf sent limited troop numbers to support the effort.  India’s 
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Air Force commenced air operations but shied away from entering Pakistan air space.  After 
taking severe losses, Pakistan ordered the remaining forces to retreat.134 
     The four wars are a testament to Pakistan’s Little Brother Syndrome.  This highly intense 
competitive drive causes government leaders, high ranking senior military officers and the 
populace to believe its military can defeat a larger foe.  Pakistan’s arrogance defies standardized 
military numerical logic.  Knowing your country should have the capacity to defend itself is a 
real world condition.  Believing your military can defeat a country twenty times larger than your 
own is a Little Brother Syndrome indicator. 
 
Chapter Three 
North Korea 
 
     Seen as an Asian outpost for American ideals, Korea was divided into two separate parts in 
the final days of World War Two.  This American effort to free Korea from its Japanese 
overlords was quickly seen by the other remaining superpower, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics or the USSR, as an intrusion into Asian affairs within their sphere of influence.  
Having overrun the last remaining Japanese forces in Manchuria, the USSR agreed to a 
temporary solution to split the country.  Both the USSR and the United States agreed to oversee 
free elections after the war so that Koreans themselves could decide upon their own form of 
government consensually.  Despite United Nations’ military action between 1950-1953, 
numerous cross-border military incidents, occasional North Korean terrorist assaults and now 
northern held nuclear weapons, this “temporary solution” has survived sixty-five years to this 
day without a political or military resolution.   
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     As a peninsular state divided in half, Korea was viewed as a very young nation in 1945 and 
was deemed by both the USSR and the US as not being prepared to rule itself.135  Having 
survived the political decision to divide the country, North Koreans were still being treated by 
the USSR as underlings.  While the Japanese over-seers were gone, they were simply replaced 
by communist Russians who controlled all aspects of North Korean government activities.136  
Needing a leader the USSR could trust, the Soviets chose a former Korean Manchuria guerilla 
fighter who had been heavily indoctrinated in communist ideology.137  Kim-il Sung, a sickly 
former major in the Soviet Army’s Eighty-eighth Brigade, which never saw actual combat was 
chosen by the Soviets to represent the Korean people and be their communist leader.   
     Kim assumed control of the northern branch of the Korean Communist Party in December 
1945.  In February 1946, with the help of his Russian backers, he was chosen as the chairman of 
the Interim People’s Committee.  Kim began to raise ties with communist cells already located in 
South Korea before the proposed 1948 United Nations sponsored “vote” to decide reunification.  
Although accepted by the communist cells already operating in the South, Kim was unable to 
exercise or expand communist influence in the South.  The heavy handed election held on May 
10 , 1948 gave the political victory to Syngman Rhee, a strong anti-communist, supported by the 
United States.  His party for the “elected delegates” formed the “National Assembly of South 
Korea” under the U.N. plan for reunification.  On 20 July, Rhee was appointed president and a 
month later, 15 August 1948, the association declared itself the “Republic of Korea”.138  United 
States Military control of Korea was turned over to the civilian Republic to govern itself.   
     As a response, Kim-il Sung called for the Conference of the Leaders of Political Parties and 
Social Organizations of North and South Korea and held the meeting in Pyongyang, 29 June 
1948.  The conference called for an open and general election to be held for deciding how all of 
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Korea, both North and South, could be reunified as a single government.  Ignored in the South, 
the 25 August 1948 vote created the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK, on   
September 9th 1948.  While South Korea was recognized by the United States, North Korea was 
recognized by the USSR on 13 September 1948.  What started off as a simple demarcation line 
for joint military operations during World War II was now the beginning of a cold war between 
the two super powers. 
     Sung’s first major military decision which included his private obsession, was to try and 
overtake South Korea and combine the two Koreas into one singular state.139  With Kremlin’s  
backing, he launched a surprise artillery attack that met with quick success.  His military 
propaganda department instantly began broadcasting saying that the South had attacked the 
North.  He then launched a full blown invasion plan that had been written by his Soviet military 
advisors.140  North Korean forces easily pushed back their adversaries to the point their own 
supply lines were stretched exceedingly and dangerously thin.141  President Truman who had 
recently authorized pulling American troops out of Korea found his remaining military 
inadequately prepared for such an assault.  Had it not been for American air-power, the North’s 
attack on the last South Korean strongholds in the southern part of the country would have 
succeeded.142 
     President Truman called upon the newly created United Nations to intervene with troops, 
military hardware and supplies.  While American forces landed at Inchon harbor behind enemy 
lines, the combined U.N. force was able to move the Northern troops back to the international 
border and beyond.  What appeared to be an easy victory for the North soon became a rout with 
many North Koreans leaving their farms and villages in order to escape to South Korea.143   
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     Kim-il Sung pleaded for Russian and Chinese intervention in order to prevent North Korea’s 
collapse.  Russia, sensing the United States was not going to back down, refused any direct 
assistance other than covert aircraft, pilots and aircraft support personnel.  Stalin’s advisor 
Khrushchev did not want the war to turn into a global conflict with possible nuclear 
ramifications.  He convinced Stalin not to send ground forces despite the fact the U.S.S.R. 
military had drawn the war plans.  On the other hand, Communist China sent thousands of 
ground troops to combat the U.N. forces.  The charges of entire Chinese divisions, bad weather 
conditions, and inhospitable terrain complicated U.S. led efforts.  The Chinese entry into the war 
finally pushed the Americans back to the recognized 1945 international border when a truce was 
signed in 1953 ending three years of conflict.144 
     An important consideration of the war’s outcome was the fact Kim-il Sung remained in power 
in North Korea.  He was able to convince both Chinese and Russian government elites that his 
leadership was needed to reconstruct North Korea.  The war had proved disastrous for the 
North’s agricultural system, its civil production facilities, and even far worse for its citizens.  
North Korea lay in ruins.  Sung, however, began implementing the same public relation 
techniques that his Russian handlers had used during his first rise to power.  He convinced the 
remaining North Korean population that it was he who had saved North Korea from South 
Korea’s, United States’ and United Nation’s combined treachery.  His use of mass media to 
obscure the facts into his favor, simply worked.   
     From his introduction to power in 1945 till his death in 1994, Kim-il Sung used state mass 
media to bolster his public image and his public standing with the North Korean population.  
Sung was originally portrayed by his USSR handlers as a former guerilla fighter against the evil 
Japanese forces during WWII.  His later personification as a Korean defender against United 
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States aggression and deceit during the Korean War was plastered, broadcasted, and written 
about extensively.145  This was done despite the fact that Sung concocted the whole war idea and 
had agreed to let the Soviets conduct the planning if Stalin would grant his permission.  Time 
and again, whenever North Korea was involved in an international incident, the person who 
saved the day was always the great leader, Kim-il Sung.146 
     This propaganda technique is not new but its effect for North Korea’s Kim-il Sung and his 
heirs proved to be extremely successful.  The method has its basis in Gustave LeBon and his 
1913 work “The Psychology of Revolution”.  In section three of The Role of the Leader in 
Revolutionary Movements, LeBon writes: 
“….the unconscious collective mind of the crowd seems bound up with the mind of the 
leader.  The latter gives it a single will and imposes absolute obedience.”  
 
“The leader acts especially through suggestion.  His success depends on his 
fashion of provoking this suggestion.”147   
 
“….According to the suggestions of the leaders, the multitude will be calm, furious, 
criminal, or heroic.  These various suggestions may sometimes appear to present a 
rational aspect, but they will only appear to be reasonable.  A crowd is in reality 
inaccessible to reason; the only ideas capable of influencing it will always be sentiments 
evoked in the form of images.”148  
 
The irony that exists in the North Korean use of LeBon’s philosophy is that Germany’s Nazi 
Party of the 1930’s and 1940’s extensively used the same revolutionary techniques as well.149   
LeBon’s and Otto Weininger’s early 20th Century works were incorporated as the foundation for 
the Nazi Party.  Included was the idea of a singularity of genius or a timeless man (aka Adolph 
Hitler) who could see the meaning of (historical) events due to his significant memories.  This 
central theme was adopted by Hitler, and more importantly, by his supporters who eventually 
created Hitler’s supremacy displacing Germany’s weakly held democratic rule.  There were 
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other European political and state leaders who integrated this image method including Italy’s 
Fascist Party leader Mussolini and the USSR’s Generalissimo Joseph Stalin. 
     After the Korean War, Sung used the singularity of genius technique in order to retain his 
control over North Korea.  He faced very long odds against retaining his leadership role of 
Communist North Korea.  With the March 1953 death of Joseph Stalin, however, Sung managed 
to convince Khrushchev and China’s Mao Ze Dong that he could revitalize North Korea and 
shape it into a shining example of a communist workers’ paradise/utopia.  Using the communist 
indoctrination training he received in Soviet Manchuria during World War II, Sung replicated 
Stalin’s, and other European leaders’ method of convincing his own people what a great leader 
he was.  Sung manipulated the country’s people and resources via each level of the communist 
Korean Workers’ Party ensuring he was portrayed as the single great leader who was above all in 
his abilities.150 
     For the financial backing needed for this new Korean Communist revolution, Sung relied 
heavily upon both China and the USSR.  Between 1945 till 1970, it is estimated the total U.S. 
dollar amount North Korea received in foreign aid from communist China was $541 million; 
they received $1.146 billion from the USSR.151  The foreign aid was first used primarily to 
rebuild North Koreas shattered military forces.  Once secured, the construction of housing and 
heavy factories necessary for the production of steel and other civil construction components 
were quickly built.  In the later 1950’s and 1960’s, North Korea was seen as an emerging nation 
despite its communist government.  Subsequently, North Korea’s governmental leaders tried to 
entice those that had fled south during the war as well as the large Korean communities 
positioned outside the country to return.  The largest external Korean community was located in 
Japan where hundreds were recruited to return to the north.  The Gross Domestic Product index 
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for North Korea during this time period surpassed that of South Korea.  Many in South Korea 
and its worldwide Korean communities saw the South as being under the dictatorship of a former 
criminal with U.S. ties.  Until April 1960, South Korean President Rhee Syngman was seen as 
using the same Japanese imperialism tactics along with the political elites who came from the 
former Japanese land owners controlling the country just like they had before World War II.  
After Syngman’s resignation, the South Korean Major General Park Chung-hee seized power in 
a military coup.  For some, the prospect of returning to their native country proved to be too 
difficult to decide while others returned to the North seeing better opportunities and a country 
with more promising recovery in the form of its GDP.  Using its new found standing within the 
Western world, North Korea continued to request favorable trade and economic development 
efforts with the USSR and China.  From the 1950’s to the mid 1970’s, using North Korea as a 
model of worldwide communist achievements, both countries eagerly and continuously agreed.  
     During Kim-il Sung’s reign over North Korea, his mimicking style of an occult communist 
leader also had a darker side geared toward the state support of terrorism as a tool of 
international relations.  From 1953 to 1994, North Korea was a bastion of state supported 
terrorism and used it as a means to destabilize South Korea’s government, military, and civil 
society.  The fact that no peace treaty was ever signed ending the Korean War gave Kim the 
ability to deny any or all “terrorism” acts.  Sung would often simply deny any incident had even 
occurred or have it placed in the international columns of a military option.152  Since there was 
not an official or internationally recognized peace treaty, what could South Korea do except 
expect more warfare versus terrorism or a combination of the two?   
     To this day, North Korea’s government is routinely accused of the state sponsorship of 
terrorism and appears to use terrorism as a means to influence South Korea, Japan, and other 
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regional East Asian countries.  The University of Maryland sponsors the National Consortium 
for the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism’s “Global Terrorism Database”.153  
Based primarily on newspaper, magazine, and media reports of significant new stories from 
around the world, the GTD verifies the incidents as acts of terrorism before logging them into the 
database.  The University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database does have a specific time or 
date restriction since the dataset was established in 1970 and does not have any previously dated 
information.  A search result conducted on 16 January 2010, however, shows 53 separate acts of 
terrorism within South Korea or against South Korean owned government (including federal and 
defense), business, and/or civil organizations’ buildings, vehicles, and/or personnel (START-
GTD).  The dataset was searched from 1970 to 2010.  Of these incidents recorded, nine were 
directed against South Korea’s recent assistance to the U.S. military for medical support 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Forty-four terrorist incidents were mostly aimed at the 
country’s military establishment and in a few cases at local and/or federal police.  Of those forty-
four suspected terrorist acts, nineteen episodes were attributed to internal leftist radical student 
organizations.  That leaves approximately twenty-five, which are of an unknown origin, i.e. there 
is no known perpetrator.    This could be linked to Terrorism’s definition as the weapon of the 
weak and hence also related to little brother syndrome and would equally apply to Pakistan 
     These terrorist incidents can be directly traced to North Korea and their use by Kim-il Sung to 
influence regional and international relations and opinions.  These include attempted 
assassinations, such as the 1968 Blue House raid (South Korea’s presidential palace), the 
December 1969 hijacking of a Korean Airlines flight YS-11, and the 1974 attempt to kill South 
Korea’s President Park Chung-hee by a presumed North Korean agent Mun Se-gwant.  Each 
major action was a direct attempt to cause the South Korean government to fail or lose face. 
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     The 17 January 1968 Blue House raid was conducted by 31 North Korean special operations 
trained commandos.154  The team infiltrated the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and made their way 
to Seoul in two and three man squads.  Seeing heightened security, they changed their original 
plan and changed into local South Korean Twenty-First Infantry army uniforms.  They marched 
to the Blue House but were stopped by local police outside the Blue House perimeter.  A 
firefight ensued and the commandos fled toward the DMZ.  Twenty-nine were killed by South 
Korean police and/or army units as well as American army troops.  Only one North Korean 
commando was captured alive and two are suspected to have made it back to North Korea.   
     This brazen attack by North Korean commandos demonstrated the North’s resolve and did not 
result in South Korean retaliation.  The psychological effect on public opinion towards fighting 
the north was pitted against the South Korean government’s effort to dampen expectations for a 
renewal of hostilities.  This is particularly true with the United States wanting to ease tensions 
and backing away from any indication that it would respond to or reciprocate the North’s 
aggression.  Public opinion called for decisive action(s) against the northern communists but no 
direct military action was ever taken. 
     This lack of resolve/action was dramatically evident when two days after the Blue House 
affair, North Korea sized an American communications interception ship, the USS Pueblo.  The 
ship was taken in international waters and the crew was forced to spend twelve months within a 
North Korean prison while negotiations yielded no concessions except from the Americans.  This 
act of war was tolerated.  American public opinion decried the lack of aggressive military action 
and the United States lost face in the international arena.155 
     One of the more dramatic terrorist acts North Korea committed was the hijacking of Korean 
Air’s YS-11 turboprop passenger aircraft, 11 December 1969.  Cho Ch'ang-hǔi, a North Korean 
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agent boarded the flight from Gangneung Airbase, a joint military-civilian use airport in 
Gangneung, Gangwon-do province.  The aircraft was flying to Seoul’s Gimpo International 
Airport.  The aircraft was taken to Wonson Airfield in North Korea where both the crew and 
passengers were indoctrinated by North Korean agents using communist ideology.  North and 
South Korea governments held talks in January 1970 which resulted in most of the passengers 
being released but not all.  The four crew members and seven passengers who represented the 
educated upper class were permanently detained.156  To date; neither the aircraft nor the 
remaining eleven South Korean hostages have ever been released. 
     Five years later, Kim’il Sung ordered an assassination attempt against South Korea’s 
president Park Chung-hee.  The South Korean president was known as a far right conservative 
whose continued political career was favored by the United States.  The public was growing 
disenchanted with Chung-hee’s conservative policies including supporting the U.S. Viet-Nam 
war effort.  Between 1965 and 1973, over 300,000 South Korean troops had been stationed in 
South Viet-Nam.  President Chung-hee had recently won the 1972 election without opposition.  
In essence, he had created a self-styled dictatorship based on the very controversial Yusin 
Constitution enacted by the South Korean legislature.  At the time of his attempted assassination 
which caused his wife’s death, South Korea’s tight-knit ties to the United States was 
unquestionable.  If North Korea could cause a situation that would bring down the South’s 
government, Kim-il Sung was willing to try.  The expected response to the North’s provocation 
was absolutely nothing except maybe more diplomacy and diplomatic talk.   
     The psychological leadership strategy used by Kim-il Sung was to keep the disputed United 
Nations’ declaration of a recognized sovereign southern country as a protracted conflict.  His use 
of state sponsored terrorism was initiated to inflame political unrest in the south while 
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consolidating financial and military support from China and Russia.  The use of South Korea as a 
protracted conflict is necessary for the continuation of his own regime and allows for three basic 
paradigms: 
  A) The Great Leader 
  B) Saving Face In the land of Confucianism 
  C) The “Catch Me If You Can” Competitive Drive 
 
          As stated, the image of the infallible great leader as one who guides the state to greater 
good was not new when adopted by Kim-il Sung.  His continued use of this psychological 
technique did empower him to have absolute control over the government as well as the 
country’s resources and its people.  Sung had to find a way however to keep popular sentiment 
from changing its focus from he being the great leader to the people demanding his departure.  
Using North Korea’s protracted conflict with the South, state media was able to homogenize the 
idea that all persons in the state had a hand in making North Korea the great state that it is.  As 
long as the masses follow the ideas, beliefs, and recommendations of the great leader, North 
Korea will be a worker’s paradise.   
     The substantial flaw in the operational aspect is knowledge.  State achievements would have 
nothing to be compared against without demonizing South Korea and its United States support.  
With limited to no outside information sources available to the population, the drive to have 
North Korea's and especially it’s leader’s virtues excel all others is paramount.  In contrast, the 
only acceptable terminology when describing outside North Korea is all negative.  Any 
demonstration of individual or popular dissent is quickly subverted and dealt with by the 
Communist Workers Party, the political police called the “Bowibu”,157 and/or government law 
enforcement agencies.  All persons are indoctrinated on how if only they follow the virtues of the 
Great Leader true happiness can be obtained.    
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     Kim-Il Sung also used Confucian religious teachings as a way to influence regional and 
international politics towards his favor.  As a whole country, Korea experienced four dynamic 
time periods under Chinese or Japanese rule.  The four major periods are the Unified Silla 
Kingdom, the Koryo Dynasty, the Choson Dynasty, and the Japanese Occupation Period ending 
with the presently divided North Korea and South Korea.158  Japanese colonial rule was the 
harshest for Koreans.  In an attempt to eradicate Chinese cultural influences, Japanese 
government policy towards the Koreans centered on the removal of lifelong Chinese cultural ties 
with a redirection of educational, government policy, religious edicts, and an emphasis of having 
a Japanese focused national identity.  Japanese political and industrial colonial leaders 
emphasized the importance of being Japanese centering in on all forms of business practices and 
common economic activities.159  
     Religion was the one steadfast area where the Korean people held onto their belief structures 
and refused to allow Japanese land owners to have cultural influence.  Since the Koryo period, 
the majority of religious worshipers were followers of Confucian or for the time period, what is 
called Neo-Confucianism.  The tenants of Confucius are respect for authority especially elders, 
and watching out for your nuclear family’s reputation so as not to damage it with your own 
actions.  Korean piety was placed at the front of societal norms and those who conformed were 
welcomed while violating civil norms was to “lose face”.   
     In practice, Kim-il Sung ironically used these Confucian norms as a way to continually 
embarrass South Korean government, civil society, and culture.  The term ironic applies in this 
situation since Sung was raised by Protestant missionaries when he was growing up.  This did 
not stop him however from causing international incidents and pointing out how if the South 
Koreans were better followers of Confucian principles, their government would not have lost 
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face in the latest debacle.   
     Examples of Kim-il Sung using this technique include the U.S.S. Pueblo incident, the 1969 
shooting down of an American EC-121 aircraft, and the kidnapping of foreigners.  The 1954 
international incident involving the communications listening station on the U.S.S. Pueblo was 
the first large scale international crisis the North Koreans staged and controlled.  The occurrence 
was first reported by the international free press as an American Navy vessel operating in 
international waters that was illegally seized by North Korea’s Navy.  North Korea claimed the 
vessel was off course and was residing in its declared coastal boundary conducting espionage.  
Taking place only three days after the Blue House assassination attempt, North Korea sought and 
received United States agreement on negotiations to end the affair.  What the U.S. Secretary of 
State Foster Dulles had not counted on was the tenacity of the North Korean denial and its 
extremely aggressive and accusatory tone demanding a U.S. apology.  Much akin to the 
negotiations ending the Korean War, North Korea would not release the ship or the crew until a 
full formal U.S. apology was made.  After twelve months of negotiations, the U.S. did issue a 
formal apology but the U.S.S. Pueblo ship itself was never returned.  Rather, the ship is still in 
North Korea and being used as a museum piece as an example of aggressive U.S. military 
behavior.  The Great Leader once again saved the day and vanquished the foes of communism by 
making them lose their honor in front of the international community. 
     Another military incident occurred 15 April 1969 when the North Korean Air Force shot 
down a U.S. Navy EC-121 during its signals intelligence (SIGINT) mission.  Military strategists 
saw the shoot down as a test of the new American president Richard Nixon in the very 
beginnings of his presidency.  Nixon ordered the pentagon to prepare a list of military options 
including recommendations.  More than two dozen plans were presented to the president and his 
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advisors.160  President Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger could not find 
additional ways to punish North Korea militarily without considering possible nuclear 
ramifications.  National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, 
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Earle Wheeler and he finally decided upon fleet maneuvers as a 
way to forewarn North Korea.  The following week, an identical “Beggar Shadow” SIGINT 
mission using different aircraft was conducted to show North Korea the American government 
would not be deterred.  The United States Navy presented a demonstration of force off North 
Korea’s coast; but again, no responsive military action was conducted.    The loss of thirty-one 
American service members would not be answered with a military response.  Due to the inability 
of conducting operations without a nuclear response, America was seen once again, losing face 
in the international arena. 
     Once thought of as only a conspiracy theory, the kidnapping of North Korean ex-patriots and 
other foreign nationals has proven to be a dangerous but confirmed North Korean government 
action.161  Between 1977 and 1981, North Korea kidnapped both Korean ex-patriots and 
Japanese citizens.  In addition, nearly five hundred South Koreans consisting mostly of young 
girls were forcibly taken to North Korea against their will.  Citizens from a total of twelve 
countries were abducted and taken to North Korea to be used as language instructors for military 
Special Forces and spy training centers.162, 163   
     These human rights violations committed by North Korea also defy the Confucian norm of 
familial piety.  The protection of family members is a cornerstone of familial piety and North 
Korea’s illegal activity forcibly removed relatives including children from secure settings.  
Hundreds of South Korea’s young women and girls were being abducted without a trace.  Until 
Kim Jong-Il 2002 announcement, North Korea denied any involvement.164 
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    The third paradigm used by Kim-il Sung’s government is the “catch me if you can” 
competitive drive.  There are a series of events that belie Sung’s efforts to get away with 
whatever is possible.  Between 1953 and 1994 there were numerous North Korean caused 
international crises and forty-four plus terrorist incidents in South Korea.165  South Korean 
military units and American infantrymen also encountered brutal and continuing skirmishes in 
the DMZ from 1966 – 1970.166  One of the most egregious experiences for South Korea and the 
international community was the wholesale kidnapping of prominent South Koreans and 
expatriates in East Asian countries.  All of these acts depict a leader who continually skirts the 
edge of international norms in order to prove that both he and his country are more than worthy 
adversaries who must be contended with. 
      This “catch me if you can” paradigm proved advantageous to North Korean propaganda 
efforts.  It demonstrated that a small nation like North Korea could continually agitate western 
international relations without much fear of retaliation.  Propaganda directed at the U.S. and 
South Korea showed the inability of a large super-power who was powerless against the North 
despite the United States’ greater military capabilities.  The only direct threat to the United States 
was in the matters of foreign policy or foreign relations; i.e. saving face in front of the world.  
The incidents were never enough to force the U.S. to commit the necessary military resources or 
personnel or convince its allies of the need for decisive action.  Neither the United States nor 
South Korea could commit itself militarily without the risk of having China and/or Russia 
intercede on North Korea’s behalf.  
     Kim-il Sung did not let age affect his policy making nor interfere with North Korea's 
international relations; in fact, he continued to take fantastic risks and drastic actions.  From 
1974 to 1994, in the last twenty years of his life, there is the appearance of him using his son, 
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Kim Jong-il as a tool to implement both his policies and practices.  While most international 
observers figured there would be a massive power struggle over who would eventually replace 
the aging communist dictator, Kim was secretly training his son to take over what amounted to a 
communist hermit kingdom. 
     Kim Jong-il is the first son and later only surviving son of Kim-il Sung and his first wife Kim 
Jong-suk.  Born in April 1943 during World War II, little is known of this future leader's history.  
As a closed society, unless a close ally defects to South Korea or to the free world, the personal 
lives of most state leaders is kept a state secret.  Other than what is propagated by the state, 
researchers, reporters and intelligence analysts have little chance to uncover the truth about a 
person's personal interactions and/or deeds.  Kim Jong-il's past is strictly and very tightly 
controlled and protected. 
     One event that helps to define Kim Jong-il's life and future actions as a state leader that has 
managed to escape North Korea censorship involves Kim's action as a little boy.  As told by 
author Bradley K. Martin in his detailed account of North Korea, Under the Loving Care of the 
Fatherly Leader, North Korea and the Kim Dynasty, Kim and his younger brother Shura were 
playing in a pond (later claimed by North Korea to be a cement swimming pool).  Kim Jong-il 
was only six years old but he was rough-housing his four year old little brother by repeatedly 
shoving him back into the pond/pool.  Kim did not like the attention his younger brother received 
and terribly resented him.  While bullying his perceived sibling rival, Kim Jong-il killed his 
younger brother by drowning him. 
     Kim's mother was in the house during the murder and later claimed she walked out to the 
pond finding Kim either pushing his little brother into the water or forcibly holding him down 
underneath.  She immediately called Kim-il Sung who rushed home to find Kim still in the pond 
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and his other son floating in the water.  Kim-il supposedly screamed at Kim, "What did you do?!  
What did you do!!?"  Despite taking his youngest son out of the water and driving him to the best 
available doctor, Kim's murderous attempt succeeded. 
     When Kim Jong-il came into prominence, it was in his later life when his father "The Great 
Leader" began training and using him to implement his plans.  Kim Jong-il was serving in the 
DPRK's Communist Workers' Party and working his way up the bureaucratic chain.  His 
influence as the Great Leader’s son did not stop him from trying to build a coalition of his own 
supporters.  If anything, his father's appeal was to be used by Kim Jong-il to further his own 
societal, political, and monetary gains. 
     Kim-il Sung did take notice of his son's later political efforts despite the obvious history of 
mental illness.  Sung also used his son as a close ally to carry out various military actions as well 
as terrorist incidents.  While Kim was never physically involved in any of the engagements, he 
was known to be both the planner and financier of several notable events that brought North 
Korea international condemnation.   
     The first of many happenings was the 1983 bombing in Rangoon, Burma that was intended to 
kill South Korea's president Chun Doo-hwan.  While the bombing missed its intended target, the 
blast ended up killing twenty-one individuals including four cabinet ministers of South Korea's 
government, the Presidential Chief of Staff, the South Korean Ambassador to Burma, press 
reporters and four Burmese nationals in the crowd. 
     The second international incident was the 1987 downing of Korean Air Flight 858.  The mid-
air bombing destroyed the aircraft and caused the deaths of eleven crew members and all one 
hundred and four passengers.  An agent of North Korea's covert military operations team was 
caught by the Bahrain police.  Agent Kim Hyon Hui told the investigators that the overall leader 
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who ordered the operation was none other than Kim Jong-il.  The objective he said was to disrupt 
the 1988 Summer Olympics being held in Soul, South Korea.  The attack was conducted to 
shame South Korea and show the international community South Korea could not prevent the 
attack.  The secondary mission of the attack was to scare away international tourists from 
attending the Olympic Games and events.  The horrible deaths of innocents did not succeed as 
intended by Kim.  The games continued unabated.  The desperate North Korean actions do 
demonstrate however the extreme level of dangerous risks these instigators were willing to take. 
     An analogy can be drawn from the failings of North Korea’s economy and the health of its 
leader Kim-il Sung.167 At age 60 in 1972, Kim’s birthday was a national celebration for the 
leader who was showing signs of his age.  In comparison, civil infrastructure projects including 
those necessary for agricultural production were not hitting their targets either by the due dates 
or the production goals that were set by the central government.168  Despite new rhetoric and a 
new five year plan from 1972-1976 that called for increased food production, the government set 
goals were not being met.169  At the same time, the North Korean military was being vastly 
expanded.  By 1974, over seven hundred thousand men were in the armed forces.  Instead of 
utilizing manpower capabilities in agricultural improvement programs, North Korea’s 
government placed huge numbers of the population into active duty status.170  There was much 
speculation as to why this was occurring.  Analysts debated the causes including the 1969 Nixon 
Doctrine that called for Asian allies to bolster their own military numbers and America’s slow 
withdrawal from Viet-Nam.  One theory was that Kim-il Sung was considering one last military 
attempt to unify Korea under the communist flag.  Park, South Korea’s president began to bolster 
the South’s military forces as a precaution.  As the North continued to increase its military well 
into the 1980’s, the more it intensified the economic ruin and starvation of the rest of the 
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population. 
     Kim-il Sung died 8 July 1994 and his son Kim Jong-il succeeded his father just as Kim-il 
Sung announced in a 1980 speech during a formal dedication.171  As Kim-il Sung’s health began 
to wane in the 1980’s, Kim Jong-il used the KWP’s and state’s propaganda departments to 
bolster his own image and achieve the political power base he desired.  Kim Jong-il had not been 
building his political entourage and power base solely from the Korean Workers’ Party alone but 
primarily with North Korean military officers and the North’s powerful military community.  
Jong-il ensured his power by cultivating close friendships and personal alliances with the ever 
burgeoning military establishment.172  His father had him appointed as leader of all North 
Korean military forces just three years before his 1994 death.  Kim Jong-il was given the title 
“The General” despite never having served a single day of military active duty.  After his 
father’s death, Jong-il attempted elevated his own standing with the population, claiming the title 
“Dear Leader”, then “Great Leader” and later “Supreme Leader“.173    
        Kim Jong-il had a sordid past controlling state terrorism and his new leadership role of a 
country known to be developing nuclear weapons had the international community alarmed.  
Right before his father’s death, the Agreed Framework limiting North Korea’s plutonium based 
nuclear research had been negotiated with ex-president Carter.174  The agreement halted 
operating the Yongbyon nuclear reactor originally built by the Russian government.   The United 
States deal included the construction of two light-water reactors as replacements for lost energy 
production.  In addition, the United States was to supply heavy fuel-oil as a substitute until the 
reactors could be built.  With Kim-il Sung’s death, the international community was worried the 
new state leader would not honor the non-binding, non-legal agreement.175   
     North Korea has a long history of trying to obtain nuclear capabilities, both civil and military 
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technologies.  In 1964, the Fatherly Leader attempted to purchase or barter nuclear weapons 
from China’s Mao Zedong.  To Kim-il Sung’s dismay, the Chinese leader flatly turned him 
down.  He formally asked again in 1974 but achieved the same results.176  During the 1980’s 
modernization period, North Korean officials solicited the Soviets who agreed to sell North 
Korea four light-water nuclear reactors.  The deal was never formalized due to the Soviets 
requiring hard currency which North Korea did not have.  Instead, an economic, scientific, and 
technical agreement was signed which included a provision for the four reactors.  
     North Korea was not totally devoid of nuclear power plants but the limited Russian 
technology dated their efforts with a 1970’s 5-megawatt research reactor located in Yongbyon.  
The site was monitored by United States intelligence satellites which could identify the reactor 
cooling ponds and plutonium processing center.  To a nation that preferred covert operations and 
hiding strategic civil and military sites from the United States and South Korean militaries, 
Yongbyon was a known target that could easily be observed and just as easily be hit. 
     Kim Jong-il’s knowledge or understanding of his father’s nuclear plans is unknown but his 
own plans have caused political consternation among the world’s nuclear powers.  Jong-il has 
used his country’s nuclear research program to threaten Western powers and forced them to grant 
concessions.  He has kept the United Nation’s International Atomic Energy Agency from 
completing their inspection work at the Yongbyon nuclear site.  Though his father signed the 
Agreed Framework on his nation’s behalf, Jong-il has not agreed to reinstate the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.  Kim Jong-il has mastered the ability to get what he wants by drawing 
assistance from the free world all the while continuing his nuclear weapons program(s).      
     One of the major aspects of Little Brother Syndrome is the ability of the state and/or leader 
using the technique to achieve their desired results without interference from the International 
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Community (I.C.).  How could “catch me if you can” be tolerated by the I.C., particularly by a 
small and militarily insignificant state?  If behaving badly as a little brother, should he not expect 
to be corrected by a parent or older mature sibling?  Would not the same be expected by smaller 
states’ leadership which is constantly agitating the International Community? 
     North Korea’s rise began during the end of World War II and amid the beginnings of the 20th 
Century’s Cold War.  Kim-il Sung’s mastery use of Little Brother Syndrome included playing 
his major communist supporters against one another.  This allowed him flexibility when dealing 
with the world’s two largest communist states, China and the Soviet Union, and also allowed 
him to obtain greater resources from each.  If he angered the Soviets, he could always pay 
homage to the Chinese as the Asian leader of communism and praise them as having a better 
communist system.  He made them prove to him which country was the better communist within 
the International Community by helping to support communist North Korea in its time of need.  
In short, this little brother was playing communist Mom against communist Dad. 
     North Korean leadership used the Little Brother Syndrome techniques to their fullest 
advantage.  Knowing the United States would never risk full scale military intervention for fear 
of escalation and possible nuclear war, North Korea was perfectly suited to small scale combat 
incursions, the state support of terrorism, and the willful kidnapping of South Korean and 
Japanese citizens.  From the country’s very beginnings, North Korean unpredictability was 
underscored by the uncertainties, unwillingness, and inability of the International Community to 
respond to these actions.  With the United States, the International Community’s lack of political 
support and foreign policy ambiguity left its leadership having to deal with North Korea on its 
own.  The only firm foreign policy the United States leadership could attempt was verbal 
containment and North Korea, the little brother in this nuclear family was not listening. 
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Chapter Four 
“Little Brother Snares the Sun” 
LBS and the Drive for Nuclear Arms: 
“Though brave Dormouse had freed the sun, everybody realized that Little Brother, 
who had snared the sun, was the wisest being in the world, and the one with great power.  Since 
that time the humans have been the chiefs over the animals, the hunters instead of the hunted.”177 
 
     North Korea and Pakistan are on opposite sides of China geographically but when it came to 
creating nuclear weapons these two nations on opposing sides of the political spectrum came 
together to create new world threats.  North Korea’s “Hermit Kingdom,” a dictatorship with little 
regards for human rights, paired up with Pakistan, a semi-democratic state whose political 
leaders have struggled to wrest power from a dominant military.  Since their creation, each state 
has fought to retain their international identity as well as to use their international supporters for 
their protection.  Both nations have been defeated by a larger military force and have failed to 
gain the full territory they sought.  Both use state supported international terrorism to force their 
enemies to withdraw territorially, yet each has failed.  Pakistan and North Korea have also lost 
their initial International Community standings as well as the image they sought to create.  From 
their sheer Little Brother Syndrome stubbornness, both countries sought nuclear weapons as the 
means to solve these problems and now they have them. 
     Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weapons began with the third major Indian defeat of its military 
forces.  The 1971 loss of East Pakistan was a devastating blow to a people who prided 
themselves as a nation with a professional military capable of defeating India.178  What started 
the 1971 war dates back to the previous 1947 partition which left two princely Muslim majority 
provinces in India’s declared national sovereignty.  West Pakistan’s continued emphasis on 
incorporating both Jammu and Kashmir eventually caused an internal rift with East Pakistan’s 
populace who felt they were being overlooked on major budgetary and other joint country 
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decisions.179  This internal civil squabble began as a political protest but turned into a West 
Pakistan crackdown using rape, extrajudicial killings and other human rights violations against 
the civilian population.  In the eyes of the International Community, Pakistan became a 
draconian pariah state.  In contrast, India was seen as a champion and savior for international 
human rights.180  Three years later, on   8 May 1974, India exploded a “peaceful nuclear device” 
calling it “Smiling Buddah”.181  Faced with a territorial dispute with a now nuclear armed enemy 
combatant, Pakistan’s civilian and military leaders chose nuclear weapons to keep the status quo. 
     Before deciding to pursue nuclear weapons technology, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was the government’s original defense against India seeking nuclear weapons.  The 
efforts put forth by Foreign Affairs consisted of pushing United Nations negotiations to outlaw 
the creation and use of weapons of mass destruction by South Asian governments.  On 2 August 
1963, China’s Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Chou en-Lai sent 
a letter to world leaders requesting a world summit on nuclear weapons.182  His letter outlined 
China’s proposal to outlaw research and development as well as the complete prohibition and 
destruction of all nuclear warheads.  Pakistan’s General/President Ayub Khan responded 
favorably.183    His action was seen by both British and American governments as a Pakistani 
rebuff to the Western powers and an unwelcome warming of relations between a so called 
second world democracy and the Communist Bloc.184  President Ayub began serious 
negotiations by inviting both Chou en-Lai and China’s Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi to 
Islamabad.  On   3 October 1963, the British embassy in Karachi warned of the following: 
“There is no doubt that whatever private explanations are made such a visit would  
exacerbate U.S./Pakistan relations very seriously and lend colour to Indian suspicions 
that it is only a matter of time before Pakistan sides completely with China…. There have 
been suggestions that Mr. Bhutto himself has got the bit between his teeth in promoting 
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Pakistan’s relations with China and the {Communist} block and that he may be going 
further than the President and other more conservative members of the administration 
here would like.  I do not know how much substance there is in this rumor but it is 
persistent.  If it is true, there is a pretty urgent need to educate him.”185 
 
Despite the private International Community condemnations, Pakistan’s leaders saw the Chinese 
response as a means to further Pakistan’s own Little Brother Syndrome goals. 
     Pakistan’s diplomatic actions began in earnest in 1972 with Pakistan’s attempts to create a 
United Nation’s “Nuclear Weapons Free Zone” in South Asia and the Indian Ocean.186  After 
their 1971 East Pakistan defeat, Pakistan was desperately trying to avoid a nuclear armed India.  
To complicate matters, India, which had been defeated by China in the 1962 Sino-Indian border 
war, found itself facing a much tougher Chinese foe two years later in 1964 when China 
detonated a nuclear warhead.187  India would not discuss Pakistan’s nuclear proposals.  As a 
result, Pakistan turned to the International Community and the United Nations as a means to 
improve the International Community’s image of Pakistan and regain the United Nations’ trust.  
As quoted in South East Asia In Search of an Asean Community: 
 
 “For twenty-three years, from 1974 to 1997, the United Nations General Assembly,  
every single year, called for a nuclear weapons free South Asia in resolutions sponsored 
mainly by Pakistan, supported by overwhelming majorities, and opposed principally by 
India.  The resolutions went unheeded until, in 1998, both India and Pakistan conducted 
nuclear test explosions, definitively dooming the proposal.”188 
 
     Even after India’s nuclear explosion, the federal government of Pakistan tried to sway the 
International Community to help stop this nuclear proliferation.  In an attempt to bridge the bi-
polar U.S. and U.S.S.R. world to dissuade a nuclear armed India, Prime Minister Bhutto flew to 
Moscow in October 1974.  Bhutto negotiated with the Kremlin’s leaders and spoke to the Duma 
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requesting its assistance in creating a South Asia nuclear free zone.  This was not an unusual 
tactic for international politics considering the U.S.S.R. had encouraged and championed the 
same for both South America and the Mediterranean.  He also requested the U.S.S.R’S help in 
stabilizing Afghanistan and use its influence with India to intercede on Pakistan’s behalf.  Prime 
Minister Bhutto received additional U.S.S.R. aid but the communist government leaders were not 
interested in stopping India’s nuclear proliferation.189 
     Pakistan’s territorial security as a nation was also in jeopardy from not just India but a new 
adversary from the North, Afghanistan.  In July 1973, Sardar Muhammad Daoud overthrew 
Afghanistan’s king, his cousin.190   General Daoud began clandestine operations against Pakistan 
by arming dissident groups located in Balochistan, and the tribal clans in Southern 
Afghanistan/Northern Pakistan as well as the North-West Frontier Provinces.  The use of these 
armed groups made it appear Afghanistan, seeing Pakistan society’s loss of confidence in the 
military was taking a cue from India and was trying to use Pakistan’s own methods against them.  
A string of terrorist bombings occurred in several Pakistan cities.191  Pakistan’s internal police 
forces began intercepting huge arm shipments to the groups who wanted to overthrow the current 
federal government.  In Balochistan and elsewhere, the National Awami Party was banned by 
President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who saw them as ethnic terrorists versus Pakistani citizens 
unhappy with political disenfranchisement.192  The Pakistan military forces were called in to 
route the insurgents in what became a four year Balochistan civil war, 1973-1977.  The internal 
dissidents drove an unsettled national populace further into the Little Brother Syndrome’s 
paranoid consciousness that all sides including internally, were readily against them as a nation 
state. 
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     Another national issue that was helping to drive the Little Brother Syndrome was the return of 
Pakistan’s soldiers, civil authorities, and refuges from India after the 1971 war.  Hasan-Askari 
Rizvi author of Military, State and Society in Pakistan states that “91,634 Pakistani military and 
para-military personnel and civilians were taken as POWs and moved to the camps in India.”193  
The Simla Agreement which ended the war was signed July 1972.194  What the agreement did 
not settle was the repatriation of these prisoners of war and other refugees.  India’s Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi was holding them hostage so she could force the Pakistan government to 
formally acknowledge East Pakistan as the new country of Bangladesh.  In August 1973, both 
countries negotiated the P.O.W. and refugees’ return rights for those who wanted to return to 
Pakistan or India.  The agreement called for resettlement to occur between 19 September 1973 
and 30 April 1974.  Bangladesh, however, wanted to bring charges against 195 of Pakistan’s 
soldiers for international war crimes.  The Bangladesh government, supported by India, gave up 
this action when a deal was brokered by the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic 
Conference (OIC) whereby Pakistan formally recognized Bangladesh.195   
     The International Community felt all the issues raised by the 1971 war had been resolved.  
Pakistani people however felt betrayed by the military’s poor performance and resented the 
International Community’s lack of direct support for the war particularly the United States and to 
a lesser degree, even against China.  The resulting political upheaval caused Pakistan’s Supreme 
Court to officially review the military and its war operations.196  Never released publicly, the 
report placed the blame on Pakistani officers who were in charge of East Pakistan’s military and 
federal forces.  With this additional political unrest growing, Bhutto decided to crack down even 
harder on any and all internal dissention.  
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     Having lost both East Pakistan and the International Community’s positive image for its 
human rights abuses in the 1971 war, having apparently lost the hegemonic support of the United 
States’ military training, equipment and supplies, and having India explode a “peaceful nuclear 
device” in 1974, Pakistani leaders were under inordinate amounts of political stress.  Despite the 
popular political reforms being undertaken including a new Pakistan constitution in 1973, there 
was considerable turmoil in trying to find Pakistan’s right course of action.197  The Little Brother 
Syndrome’s competitive drive took over.  Prime Minister Bhutto, and later the leader of the his 
military coup against Bhutto,  General Zia ul-Haq, opted for the  pursuit of nuclear weapon as a 
nationalistic unifier of Pakistan and its Muslim citizenry.198 
     Prime Minister Bhutto was one of the first national leaders to publicly call for Pakistan to 
have nuclear weapons.  The world first took notice when on March 11, 1965 he told a 
Manchester Guardian newspaper reporter that Pakistanis “would eat grass” if necessary to match 
any nuclear capability that India develops.199  In his 1969 book The Myth of Independence, he 
wrote how it was necessary for Pakistan to be able to build its own nuclear weapons in order not 
to fall militarily behind India.200   
     As Prime Minister, Bhutto had tried to arrange a deal with France to build a nuclear fuel rods 
reprocessing facility.  Pakistan’s nuclear weapon efforts were originally all plutonium based.  
The idea was to use the spent fuel rods from a Canadian built nuclear power-plant located in 
Karachi.  The spent rods contain plutonium which could be extracted and processed into nuclear 
weapons grade material.  At the same time, the Prime Minister was also attempting to get West 
Germany to build a heavy-water production facility.  Germany eventually turned down the 
request.  France, however, was not easily swayed by the United States’ pressure to do the same 
and tell Pakistan’s government “no”.  What stopped both the deal from going through and later 
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Prime Minister Bhutto’s political ambitions was Pakistan’s 1977 national election.201  After the 
vote count, Prime Minister Bhutto claimed victory but charges of election rigging and voter 
fraud were rampant.202  To keep protests down, the Prime Minister declared martial law in the 
major cities.  The opposition party, the PNA kept up political opinion against the Prime 
Minister’s own Pakistani Peoples Party.  Saudi Arabia’s King Falid intervened and held 
negotiations between the two political parties so they could work out a possible solution and 
keep the civil peace.  For six months, both sides negotiated in good faith and were just about to 
settle the issue when Pakistan’s military forces launched “Operation Fair Play” yet another 
military coup to oust Pakistan’s civilian rule.  The coup took place on 4 July 1977 and Prime 
Minister Bhutto was arrested on corruption and a single murder charge based on allegations he 
ordered the murder of a political opponent.  By mistake, the assassination attempt killed the 
opponent’s father.  Bhutto was tried, convicted and later hung that very year.203 
     After his death, one of the more shocking revelations about Bhutto’s nuclear ambitions was 
that he was the government leader who had actively started Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.  
At the initial meeting, he had told, 
 
“a gathering of Pakistani scientists in the Punjabi city of Multan in May 1972, that he  
wanted them to start work on developing a nuclear weapons capability, which he  
declared, the country needed to ensure its security against India.”204   
 
That meeting was held just two years before India detonated a “peaceful atomic explosion” on    
8 May 1974.  Bhutto’s purpose was to organize Pakistani nuclear scientists and engineers and 
begin the process to create and manufacture nuclear weapons.  Bhutto asked those gathered in 
Multan if they could create a nuclear weapon in three years?205  Men who would later be running 
an elaborate international conspiracy for twenty plus years agreed they could do it.206  After 
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India’s atomic test two years later, Pakistan had no choice if it wanted to keep pace with India’s 
military capabilities.  Still trying for a diplomatic solution however, Bhutto sent Pakistan’s 
Ambassador to the United States, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, to ask if America’s nuclear umbrella 
would or could be extended to include Pakistan if India attacked with nuclear weapons.  The 
response from Secretary of State Kissinger was cold and harsh.  The answer was “No”.  
Kissinger told Yaqub Khan that India’s bomb test was “a fait accompli and that Pakistan would 
have to learn to live with it.”207  In addition, after the coup, the Multan meeting which started as 
a small effort, as the military and finance departments were originally opposed, soon had the 
military’s backing.  “According to (later) Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission chairman, 
Munir Ahmed Khan, the nuclear program, did not, in fact, get under way in earnest until after the 
Indian 1974 test.”208 
     The United States, using diplomatic and financial compensation, was the first and primary 
member of the International Community to try stopping Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions.  President 
Gerald Ford, trying to reestablish the United States as Pakistan’s ally, sent Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger to both India and Pakistan.  Kissinger was in Pakistan to shore up relations and 
invite Prime Minister Bhutto to the White House for a visit.209  Bhutto was eager to meet with 
the newly “unelected” President Ford.  His wish was to have the United States lift its 1965 arms 
embargo against Pakistan.  The ban on foreign military sales had been put into place right after 
the 1965 Pakistan-Indian war, and strategically and militarily, had hurt primarily Pakistan.  In an 
effort to politically manipulate a world super-power, Prime Minister Bhutto had stated during an 
October 10th 1974 interview with the New York Times: 
 
 “If security interests are satisfied, if people feel secure and if they feel they will not 
 be subject to aggression, they [will] not want to squander away limited resources in 
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 [the nuclear] direction.”210 
 
Whether the statement was one to manipulate the United States Congress or whether the Prime 
Minister was practicing Operations Security to direct questions away from nuclear development 
is unknown.  What is now known is that on January 20th, 1971 Prime Minister Bhutto had 
already given green light to Pakistani scientists working on developing nuclear weapons.211  
     When Prime Minister Bhutto met with Secretary of State Kissinger a third time in August 
1976, President Ford had written a letter to Bhutto requesting Pakistan forgo the German heavy 
water plant and the French (plutonium) reprocessing plant.  The American administration 
decided to enhance the deal by offering 110 A-7 ground attack aircraft if the Pakistani 
government would not build the nuclear fuel rod reprocessing plant the U.S. knew was for 
plutonium based nuclear weapons development.212  Kissinger hinted the U.S. could close the deal 
now but if the Democratic Party won the 1976 presidential election, the next administration 
might block the deal.  To the surprise of the Americans, Bhutto turned down the offer based on 
the advice of his cabinet members and his Pakistan Air Force Chief of Staff Zulfiqar Ali Khan.  
The strength and forcefulness of both sides’ arguments that were displayed during the formal 
meeting demonstrated to each party that Pakistan was fully committed to its nuclear decision.213 
     One of the reasons the representatives of the Pakistani government may have turned down the 
United States’ offer was Doctor A.Q. Khan.  Born in Bhopal, India, he was the youngest son of 
parents in their 40’s.214  His father, Dr. Abdul Ghafoor Khan had come to Pakistan during the 
1947 Partition of India and Pakistan.  A. Q. Khan grew up in India and later traveled to Pakistan 
to be with his parents.  He had received his university graduate degrees at Delft University of 
Technology in the Netherlands and his doctorate at the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium 
1972.  While in Europe, Khan had married a local woman, Hendrina Donkers who originated 
73 
 
from South Africa and had moved to the Netherlands.215  Khan yearned for returning to Pakistan 
but he could not find a suitable high level job within the country.  He had tried writing factory 
owners and had even gone to the extent of writing the Minister of Economics but his letters were 
all in vain.  The one letter he wrote that made it to the Prime Minister’s office was the one in 
which he described a new European process for making highly enriched uranium.216  Khan’s 
letter reached the Prime Minister during the time the Germans backed out of the heavy water 
construction contract which was needed for plutonium reprocessing.  Khan’s letter informed the 
Prime Minister about another method being used by the European company he worked for to 
create weapons grade nuclear material from highly enriched uranium.  Kauser Niazi, Pakistan’s 
information minister would later recall how Prime Minister Bhutto “toyed with the idea of 
transforming the Pakistani correspondent from Holland into a super-spy.”217  So in the Spring of 
1976 when President Ford was offering new A-7 fighter/bomber aircraft to forgo the French 
reprocessing plant, Pakistan was already investigating two separate ways to make the critical 
mass of a nuclear weapon.218 
     A.Q. Khan held degrees in metallurgy but it was his work as a subcontractor at the URENCO 
Group, a uranium research facility that led to his nuclear career in Pakistan.  The URENCO 
Group was established in 1970 by the governments of the Netherlands, West Germany, and the 
United Kingdom to ensure their civilian nuclear power reactors had a constant source of 5% 
enriched uranium rods needed by civilian based nuclear power reactors.219  The company was 
located in the Netherlands but Khan was fluent in French, German, as well as English and he had 
his former doctoral professor’s endorsement for this highly advanced scientific and engineering 
work.220  Khan’s metallurgical skills were very useful to the company since the new uranium 
enrichment process consisted of alloyed metal centrifuges spinning at extremely high rotation 
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rates.  The high speed centrifuges spun while enriched uranium hexifloride (UF6) gas was 
injected.  The lighter uranium gas stayed in the middle while the heavier gas was pushed to the 
side.  Combined in tens of multiple rows and all working at the same time, the lighter enriched 
U2 gas was sent to the next series of centrifuges multiple times until the uranium reached 95 
percent enrichment which makes it a viable nuclear weapons grade material.221  While the 
uranium centrifuge process is cumbersome and dangerous when the centrifuges rotate at speeds 
of 100,000 rotations per minute, the process is less dangerous than recovering enriched 
plutonium from spent plutonium nuclear fuel rods.222  Despite not having a high level security 
clearance needed for the advanced Top Secret technologies, Khan was given access to multiple 
sets of mechanical and engineering drawings so he could translate them for other engineering 
staffs.223  Those mechanical drawings are what he was illegally taking home and copying while 
later offering them to the Prime Minister of his home country. 
     In 1974, Pakistan’s Prime Minister decided to use A.Q. Khan and had him investigated by the 
Inter-Services Intelligence agency or ISI.  The ISI profile report cited references that Khan “had 
not yet grown up”224 and that Khan felt rather highly of himself.225  Samples of Khan’s past 
letters to factory owners and government officials were included in the report and showed those 
Little Brother Syndrome traits that he possessed.  One, he claimed to be a descendent of a former 
notable Islamic military commander from the 1100’s.  Two, he felt he would be a great asset to 
Pakistan which would one day remember his name.  Three, he was quite taken with himself and 
wanted to prove to his future employer what a great leader he would become if only given the 
chance.  Four, Khan believed he could solve Pakistan’s military threats to its existence by 
creating a nuclear weapon and having it used as a deterrent against an abhorrent India.  Included 
in the ISI report were exerts of editorials Khan had written and submitted to various European 
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newspapers.  He had written these opinion letters to the newspapers’ editors defending Pakistan 
and downgrading England, America, India, and anyone else who did not believe Pakistan was 
sincere in its goal of creating an Islamic state other nations should follow.226  Khan is not just a 
little brother.  He is a Little Brother Syndrome’s classic example with strong combative 
competitiveness.  He is out to prove to his detractors no matter their size or their capabilities, that 
not just his country, but that he, is right. 
     The first order of business for A.Q. Khan was getting authorization to build the facilities 
needed for his classified effort entitled “Project 706”.  Demonstrating his tenacious and 
combative personality, Khan demanded to see Prime Minister Bhutto.  Instead of Khan being in 
charge, Khan had been placed under Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission director, Mr. Munir 
Ahmed Khan.  Dr. A.Q. Khan became incredibly angry and belligerent about his purchase orders 
that were being ignored.  Bhutto called in the Secretary General of Defense Ghulam Ishaq Khan 
and Foreign Secretary Agha Shahi.  All agreed A.Q. Khan would be responsible for a planned 
uranium enrichment laboratory.  Army Brigadier General Zahid Ali Akbar Khan of the Army 
Corp of Engineers was given command of the construction project.227  General Khan, his 
assistants Colonel Sajawal Khan and Colonel Mahmood, and Dr. Khan decided upon Kahuta, a 
city 40 miles from Islamabad known for its remoteness yet still close to Pakistan’s political and 
capital city, Islamabad.228  Construction was started and kept at an extremely quick pace.  So 
much so, that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s regional office in Tehran, Iran received a 
report stating, 
 
 “Something strange is happening at Kahuta.  Construction work is going on at  
a pace quite uncharacteristic of Pakistan.  One can see day-to-day progress.”229 
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In 1978, the United States received a similar warning from the French government.  The French 
had finally stopped construction of a plutonium reprocessing facility at Chasma, Pakistan.230  
The official reason France decided to stop construction of the reprocessing plant was “Pakistan 
aims to get the bomb.”  In a classified cable from Washington D.C. and sent to the U.S. embassy 
in Islamabad, the Deputy Secretary of State identifies Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions. 
 
“4. YOU MAY ALSO TELL GOP {Government Of Pakistan} THAT WE ARE PREPARED 
TO CONSIDER THEIR REQUESTS FOR MILITARY PURCHASES WITHIN THE 
FRAMEWORK OF OUR GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ARMS POLICIES.  YOU MAY TELL 
THEM THAT THIS SPECIFICALLY INCLUDES CONSIDERATION OF F-5E’S (Fighter 
Aircraft) IN LIMITED NUMBERS.   
 
5.  IN MAKING THE PRESENTATION TO THE GOP, YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT OUR 
SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN IS BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT PAKISTAN WILL NOT 
ACQUIRE A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY.  IN THIS CONNECTION YOU 
SHOULD ARRANGE TO REVIEW WITH THE GOP US NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY 
AND ALL PERTINENT LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS. 
 
8. FOR PARIS – PLEASE ADVISE GOF {Government Of France} OF FOREGOING.  YOU 
SHOULD TELL GOP THAT IN OUR CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS WE HAVE 
MERELY STATED THAT WE ARE SATISFIED THAT THE CONTRACT IS NOT GOING 
FORWARD AND HAVE NOT MENTIONED ANY GOF ASSURANCES.”231 
 
The 4 October 1978 cable was sent to Islamabad and Paris immediately and with priority to 
London and other destinations proving that the International Community was fully aware of 
Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions.232 
     Dr. Khan’s plan was to obtain the ability to create nuclear weapons but it was not without 
peril.  There is no doubt Khan had simply copied the plans for URENCO’s uranium centrifuges.  
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He had even taken the drawings home with him giving himself the ability to copy all the minute 
details of the technical orders and specifications needed for centrifuge construction and how they 
were arranged in series.  When Khan left URENCO for Pakistan, he had already turned over vast 
amounts of mechanical and electrical drawings of the new centrifuges to Pakistani intelligence 
and Foreign Service officers who were located at Pakistan’s Netherland embassy.  What he 
brought with him in his suitcases he carried on his last return trip to Pakistan was even more 
important.  Khan had copied down the entire suppliers list of companies URENCO used for the 
construction and upkeep of the nuclear equipment and facilities.  The list detailed the products 
each company made for the URENCO centrifuges as well as the other support equipment needed 
for uranium enrichment.  It also contained the supplier companies’ points of contact for sales.   
     What helped Kahn and his staff’s efforts were the economic crises that were facing Europe 
and the United States.  In the 1970’s, European economies were beginning to show signs of a 
very serious recession.  Oil Producing and Export Council (OPEC)’s ban on oil sells to the 
United States and Europe were the result of the U.S. sending arms and supplies to Israel during 
the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.  These economic crises helped draw attention away from Pakistan 
and its efforts to purchase the needed nuclear equipment.  In addition, instead of buying 
complete centrifuge units, Dr. Kahn and his crew simply began by purchasing the 
subcomponents instead.  Dr. Kahn’s network included suppliers who were pushing for sales of 
parts and subassemblies that made nuclear components.  This loop-hole effect showed the 
weakness of international security and economic systems when trying to prevent nuclear 
proliferation.  By 1972, the international Zangger Committee had reached a consensus on what 
defined the equipment and material for the use or production of special fissionable material.  The 
second memoranda listed the conditions and procedures for exports that would meet the Non-
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Proliferation Treaty.233  Kahn’s technical orders however would have allowed his team to break 
down complete systems into their smallest components.  If the team could not purchase the parts, 
Kahn then turned to the Pakistani armaments industries to help reverse engineer the parts.  How 
Pakistan’s internal defense base was able to accomplish this task dates back to the late 1960’s.  
The American military export ban after the 1965 India-Pakistan war had forced the federal 
government to seek international help.  China, seeing an opportunity to build external foreign 
relations had supplied Pakistan with the needed industrial equipment.  China also trained 
Pakistan workers on advanced machine shop skills necessary to build a self-reliant armaments 
industrial base.  These industrial machine shops could then create the parts Pakistan needed for 
its nuclear research and production capabilities.  The parts that could not be reversed engineered 
were alternatively imported from European and North American manufacturers with the help of 
Kahn’s previous contacts and relations who were still residing in the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, and other countries.  Kahn’s goal was to build a suppliers network that could obtain 
these advanced technologies while claiming their intended uses were for other dual-use 
capabilities unrelated to nuclear research.  Project 706 soon earned the code name “butter 
factory” as the real ones also contained spinning centrifuges.  In a Top Secret report written by 
the Central Intelligence Agency’s “Interagency Intelligence Working Group on Nuclear 
Proliferation”, the National Intelligence Officer for Nuclear Proliferation Mr. John Despres 
wrote in a report dated 18 January 1979: 
 
 “The Community continues to be concerned that Pakistan, if it has not already done so,  
 may soon acquire all the essential components for the plant that could ultimately produce  
 the fissile material for several nuclear weapons a year.  Indeed, Pakistan may already  
 have succeeded in acquiring the main missing components for a gas centrifuge plant and  
 ancillary facilities that are probably being built to produce highly enriched uranium for  
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 weapons, perhaps even by 1982.  …..Pakistan has probably already acquired all the  
 technology—designs, plans and technical expertise—that is critical for the eventual  
 operation of this plant.”234 
 
     As Dr. Kahn and his team began to assemble their infrastructure, North Korea’s Kim Sung-il 
was also trying to obtain nuclear weapons.  Kim had originally tried to convince both 
Communist Russia and later Communist China to either sell or give North Korea operational 
control of nuclear weapons for their defense.  Whether or not he succeeded is unknown.  While 
the United States had put its own nuclear capable military assets in South Korea, there is little 
intelligence information as to how China and Russia reciprocated.  U.S. intelligence now 
declassified shows China and Russia deployed military assets in large numbers in support of 
North Korea but only Russian deployments showed air force squadrons near South Korea with 
nuclear weapons.  In contrast, the United States’ nuclear “Matador” missile program was 
initiated by the U.S. Air Force in 1951.235  Air Force units consisted of 1 to 3 missiles shaped 
like a fighter aircraft and powered by jet engines.  Takeoffs were assisted by jettisoned rockets.  
Once fired, the B-61 “unmanned bomber” used radio frequencies for guidance until overhead the 
target and detonating the nuclear warhead.  The records show U.S. Air Force Matador nuclear 
missile units were first sent to South Korea in 1958.236  The U.S. Army also deployed nuclear 
assets in the form of “Long Tom” nuclear artillery units and missile units equipped with the 
NIKE short range nuclear tipped missiles.  By the end of President Eisenhower’s second term, 
U.S. military forces in South Korea alone had 600 nuclear weapons.237  If North Korea’s leader 
was to keep pace militarily with South Korea and its United States supporter, Kim Il-Song of 
North Korea needed nuclear weapons under its own control and not through the support of either 
China or the U.S.S.R. which could sacrifice North Korea at any time they chose. 
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     The International Community took notice of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions in 1993 when 
North Korea announced its intended withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  
This announcement was somewhat expected by the United States and by South Korea since 
North Korea had long been suspected of having a plutonium based nuclear weapons program.  In 
a July 1991 meeting between President George Bush and South Korea’s President Roh Tae Woo, 
the formerly Top Secret, now declassified meeting minutes address North Korea’s nuclear and 
chemical weapon ambitions.  South Korea’s President Roh stated,  
“The North Korea nuclear threat is a big problem- not just for two of us but the whole 
world. North Korea is asking for UN membership and says it wants to join IAEA.  But 
they are trying to link inspections to a nuclear free zone on the peninsula.  We are 
respecting the U.S. policy of NCND (No Confirm No Denial) but we will enter into 
negotiations with the North based on three conditions:  1) That the U.S. maintains its 
nuclear guarantee; 2) That the North accept full inspections; 3) That North Korea give up 
reprocessing.  If they agree, we will enter into negotiations with North Korea.  But North 
Korea would like to negotiate directly with you, over our head.” 238 
 
Elected into office in 1992, President Clinton’s response to North Korea’s 1993 NPT withdrawal 
announcement was to engage the North Koreans and work a peaceful diplomatic solution.  On 21 
October 1994, North Korea and the United States signed the “Agreed Framework”.239  The terms 
called for North Korea to stop all nuclear proliferation and its nuclear weapons programs.  Part 
of the Agreed Framework also called for North Korea to stop operation of the 5-megawatt 
reactor and plutonium-reprocessing plant at Yongbyon.  North Korea was also required to stop 
the construction of the 50-megawatt nuclear reactor also at Yongbyon and the construction of a 
200-megawatt plant located in Taechon.240  In return, an international consortium called the 
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) would build two light-water 
nuclear reactors to supplement North Korea’s domestic energy needs.  The firm would 
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implement other parts of the agreement including supplying fuel oil for North Korea’s other 
energy plants until the light-water reactors were producing electricity.  KEDO would begin 
building the first light-water reactor but all the North Korean facilities had to be dismantled prior 
to the completion of the second.241  In typical Little Brother Syndrome fashion, North Korea’s 
leader readily agreed but the plan soon fell apart.   Kim Song-Il signed the Agreed Framework 21 
October 1994.  Like Pakistan, he agreed to stop his country’s plutonium research since he 
already had Dr. A.Q. Khan’s method of turning Uranium into nuclear weapons.   
     Between 1994 and the final actual signing by all parties of the Agreed Framework in 
December 1999, North Korea’s Little Brother Syndrome competitive spirit kept the United 
States and the International Community at bay while building the uranium centrifuges.  
Whenever negotiations to curb North Korea’s proliferation activities occurred, North Korea 
would simply deny the accusations.  In turn the North would accuse the International 
Community, KEDO, South Korea, Japan, and in particular the United States that these countries 
were not bargaining or acting in good faith.  In an act of provocation, on 31 August 1998, North 
Korea fired a missile over Japan which landed in the Pacific Ocean.242    On 17 November 1998, 
in the first high level talks at Pyongyang the United States accused North Korea of building a 
secret underground facility for nuclear weapons production.243  Between February 27 and 16 
March 1999, additional senior level negotiations were held.  In the midst of a horrendous famine, 
North Korea accepted the terms of the facility’s inspection but also demanded international food 
aid.  The North Korean facility was inspected in May and found to be clean of nuclear materials 
but the food aid became a disputed issue.  There were accusations that instead of sending the 
international aid to starving communities, Kim Sung-il fed the North Korean military.244  To 
keep the negotiations in flux, he then accused the United States of supplying heavy fuel oil that 
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was contaminated and in turn, had fouled the burners of the North’s electric plants.245   At the 
end of May 1999, former Defense Secretary William Perry attended another round of talks.  He 
outlined an American proposal to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.  On 
September 13th, North Korea suspended all missile flights during the continuance of 
negotiations.  Four days later, President Clinton announced the very first relaxation or easing of 
economic restrictions and sanctions that had been placed on North Korea after the 1953 ending 
of the war.  By December 1999, KEDO signed the official contract to begin construction of the 
two light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea.    
     Using an analogy, the North practiced “nuclear” negotiations like two little kids arguing in the 
back seat of the car while Mom and Dad were arguing with each other until reaching the family 
destination.  “She/He touched me!” repeatedly being announced time and time again 
complaining to the parents, i.e. the authority figures.  The shouts equate as scored points in a 
constant game of tit-for-tat.  This is the same technique used by North Korean leaders ever since 
the end of the 1950-1953 war.  Whenever an inter-state or international agreement is about to be 
signed or even if it is signed, there are other reasons why the North cannot be held accountable 
for its actions and so negotiations must continue if the International Community wants what 
North Korea considers to be a concession.  No sooner had the IC hailed the negotiations as a 
win-win situation for all parties when North Korea demanded to be compensated for the loss of 
electrical power due to the plants not being built on time along with a threat they would start up 
their nuclear facilities.  Kim il-Sung waited until Clinton left office and the newly elected 
President Bush was besieged by North Korea demanding and threatening the United States all 
over again.246 
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     While North Korean diplomats were busily engaged in playing Mom against Dad among the 
International Community members, it’s scientific and research centers had secretly been working 
with Pakistani scientists on nuclear weapons and also on missile technologies.  The exchange of 
missile technology had begun much earlier during the 1980-1988 Iran versus Iraq war.  Pakistan 
and North Korea worked together to supply Iran with missile armaments.  Each side had kept its 
missile ties with the other ever since.  The formal collusion began with Prime Minister Benazir 
Bhutto, daughter of the late Zulfikar Bhutto, who was beginning to build her own political core 
of power brokers.  Not willing to contest the military’s dominance of National Security politics, 
Bhutto was asked by A.Q. Khan in December 1993 to include North Korea in her schedule for an 
upcoming trip to China.247  She agreed and to her surprise, Kim il-Sung threw a world class 
reception for the newly elected Prime Minister.248  Bhutto’s side-trip was a diplomatic mission to 
see if North Korea would be willing to sell or trade its long-range missiles and/or associated 
technology to Pakistan.  As she later recalled in an interview with the authors of “Nuclear 
Deception” Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, on the very first evening of the formal state 
dinner, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto leaned over to Kim il-Sung and said, 
  
 “Give my country No-Dong blueprints, please.” I stated straight out.  He looked shocked. 
 I said, “We need those missiles.”  He stared at me in amazement.  I was not sure if he  
 understood and repeated my request.  I could see the translator was trying to find the right 
 way to express it.  Suddenly Kim nodded his head and said: ‘Yes.  Let’s set up technical  
 teams and they can discuss the details.’ And we continued our dinner.”249 
 
The two countries’ technical teams talked the next day and when the Prime Minister was ready to 
leave, she was presented with a bag of materials.  Included in the bag were computer disks (cd’s) 
that had the blue-prints of the No-Dong missile and its technical drawings.  Bhutto later stated 
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that the arrangements were for a cash deal only and that General Khawaja Ziauddin who now 
worked closely with Khan on all the arrangements was in charge.250   
     The North Korean and Pakistan partnership was the essential element that allowed each side 
to get what it wanted; Pakistan received advanced missile technology and North Korea was given 
a Uranium based process for creating weapons grade Uranium.251  Working covertly, Pakistan 
used an American supplied C-130 cargo aircraft to conduct multiple flights between the two 
countries.  American and British intelligence agencies began tracking the flights and took 
satellite reconnaissance photos of the C-130 trips between the two capitols.252  The diplomatic 
ties between these nuclear proliferators dated back to the 1971 East Pakistan War in which North 
Korea helped West Pakistan.  Pakistan has had an embassy in North Korea ever since.  Both 
nations also helped Iran during the Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988 supplying primarily missiles.  After 
Benazir Bhutto became Prime Minister in 1988, this on and off again diplomatic relationship was 
revitalized once again.   
     The International Community openly criticized North Korea’s nuclear actions during the 
1990’s but individual countries were also conducting their own nuclear activities.  North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons program came under intense political scrutiny particularly from the United 
States, South Korea, and Japan who were most threatened.  Despite having no nation conduct 
nuclear weapons testing for over a year, in October 1993, China conducted its 39th nuclear 
weapons test.253  China’s test occurred during the time nuclear weapons states were unable to 
agree on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to permanently end all nuclear testing.  In May 1994, 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference was held.  All parties to the 
conference agreed to extend the Treaty indefinitely along with a new set of principles and 
objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.  However, just a few days after the 
85 
 
conference, China repeated its 1964 Chou En-Lai experience and exploded a nuclear bomb “in 
the 40-150 kiloton range, despite its pledge at the conference to ‘exercise utmost restraint’ 
regarding future nuclear testing.”254   
     In December 1994, mixed messages further complicated the Nuclear Weapon States’ message 
to stop proliferation and more importantly stop testing their nuclear arsenals.  The governments 
of the United States, Russia, China, and Israel, objected to a United Nations legal review on the 
use, or the threat of use of nuclear weapons by one state against another.  The International Court 
of Justice issued its “Legality Of The Threat Or Use Of Nuclear Weapons” Advisory Opinion of 
8 July 1996.255  The International Court of Justice, in a majority opinion, stated that nuclear 
weapons have unprecedented warfare capabilities.  The fact that civilian populations are targeted 
makes their deterrence use contrary under Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United 
Nations.256  China however did not stop its testing and in August 1995, exploded its 43rd nuclear 
test this time at its Lop Nor test site.257  France complicated the international dynamics when on 
5 September 1995 it broke its own three year moratorium with a 20 kiloton detonation at its 
Moruroa atoll located in the South Pacific.258  Even the United States tested a new nuclear device 
in July 1997.  Operation “Rebound” was an underground sub-critical nuclear test that was 
conducted at the Nevada Test Site.259  This test broke a five year moratorium that the United 
States government self- imposed as a demonstration to the world it would eventually stop the use 
of nuclear weapons.  So while the nuclear war threat from the former United Soviet Socialist 
Republics was significantly diminishing, the United States provided evidence of the value of 
nuclear weapons in a competition based world. 
     1998 was the pivotal year in which India and Pakistan, in a nuclear show of force to the other, 
both exploded five nuclear warheads.  This was confirmation of the fact Pakistan had sought and 
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achieved nuclear equivocation with India.  The International Community questioned how a third 
world country as poor as Pakistan could achieve such an expensive and technically difficult 
endeavor?  Newspapers around the world asked their leaders what the International Community 
what they could do and why actions were not taken to prevent the spread of nuclear 
proliferation?  The fact is the United States intelligence agencies had notified past Presidents 
who were fully aware of Pakistan’s actions and who in turn, informed other world leaders and 
their governments as well.  Four years later in 2002, North Korea’s first nuclear explosion 
supposedly also shocked the world but then America’s nuclear intelligence teams were not 
surprised by this action either.  From 1972 forward, American Presidents had been briefed on 
how close the two countries were to producing enough fissile nuclear material to create nuclear 
weapons of mass destruction and how many viable nuclear weapons each country could annually 
produce.  What these declassified documents show is the complete failure of the Non-
Proliferation regime with the complicity of the leading nuclear powers.  Little Brother had 
captured the Sun and the world took notice.  
 
Chapter Five 
LBS & The End of Hegemonic Alliances 
 
     Pakistan and North Korea were formally created as countries and militarily defeated within 
their first five years.  After the formal separation of North and South Korea in 1948, Kim il-Sung 
sought permission and received the backing of the former U.S.S.R..  In 1950, Kim launched his 
military attack to reclaim the whole of Korea.  He was defeated primarily by United States troops 
with the military support of other United Nations member forces.  Pakistan also sought to 
reclaim territory its government proclaimed was wrongly acceded to India by the Majadrod 
Maharaja (prince) who signed an accession agreement with India for the princely states of 
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Jammu and Kashmir.  Pakistan launched a botched popular uprising (insurgency/infiltration) 
using asymmetric warfare to force India to abandon the two states.  The goal of Pakistan’s 
government was to force India to allow the Jammu-Kashmir people with their larger Muslim 
population to vote what they believed would be their “Islamic allegiance” to Pakistan.  India, 
with the help and know-how of seasoned veteran British officers, launched its own military 
operation and defeated the smaller forces Pakistan could muster.  After Pakistan’s and North 
Korea’s defeats, both countries’ requested and received help from one of the bipolar world’s 
superpowers.  Both countries signed hegemonic alliances that benefitted them economically and 
militarily.  Their extreme assiduous focus was not just the territory they never gained but their 
goal was to free the population who lived there and still inhabited these disputed regions.  The 
countries leaders claimed they had been wronged by their enemies which had at their disposal 
much larger military forces that could easily defeat them at any time.  North Korean and 
Pakistani leaders used wide spread fear to spend the vast majority of their government budgets 
on military preparedness and to strengthen their countries against an attack that could come at 
any moment.   While Pakistan and North Korea believed their hegemonic alliances would help 
protect their countries; when needed, their alliances turned out to be much less than what they 
expected. 
     After the India 1947 Partition, Pakistan quickly allied itself with the United States to 
safeguard its national security.  Pakistan feared India would attack and assimilate Pakistan into a 
single Indian nation.  Lacking modern equipment, Pakistan’s leaders signed multiple pro-
Western allegiances including the 1955 Baghdad Pact which later became Central Eastern Treaty 
Organization and the South East Asia Treaty Organization.260  The two treaties were created to 
stop the Russian and/or Chinese communists from further expansion.  Pakistan joined believing 
88 
 
the United States would not let another nation attack them including China, Russia, and their 
worst fear, India. 
     The strong belief of an assured international defense that was placed in the hegemonic 
policies practiced by Pakistan’s government leaders was quickly shattered.  Within ten years of 
their signing, no Western help came when in 1965, India crossed West Pakistan’s internationally 
recognized Eastern boundary.  After a series of military skirmishes at the Rann of Kutch and 
other border positions, Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar to seize Jammu and Kashmir using 
Kashmiri separatists, regular army, and army paratroopers all wearing civilian clothes.  India, 
needing to relieve the offensive pressure of Pakistan victories in the Northern sectors, sent 
armored columns across West Pakistan’s eastern boundary.  Pakistan’s capital city Lahore was 
targeted but instead of sending help, the United States and other western countries sent in planes 
to evacuate their citizenry.261   Classified cables between the American and British embassies 
and consulates in Pakistan were rushed back to Washington D.C. and London in hasty fashion.  
Cables only hours apart were sent trying to find and push solutions that would alleviate the 
situation and help stop the fighting.  These cables show that neither England nor America had 
any intention of coming to Pakistan’s defense.   
     Instead of supporting Pakistan, England and the United States were more concerned how the 
international balance of power could be shifted by the various possible outcomes of the war.  On 
6 September 1965, the British Minister of State met with Agha Hilaly, the High Commissioner 
for Pakistan to discuss a ceasefire and ending the war.   
“The Minister of State said that the British Government regarded the fighting as a major 
tragedy, particularly since it was a struggle between two Commonwealth countries.  This 
development was not only a disaster for the subcontinent, but one which could lead to a 
serious escalation of war outside it.”262 
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Although he had not been advised by his home government, Commissioner Hilaly replied with 
the following: 
“…he said he thought they would consider a mere cease-fire insufficient, since the 
problem would remain unsolved and fighting could only recur, and that the only 
reasonable basis for a cessation of hostilities would be the re-opening of the whole 
Kashmir question….. (Perhaps Kashmir could be evacuated and placed under a United 
Nations Mandate or similar international form of control).  Without this condition 
Pakistan, though conscious of its inability to resist a country with military and economic 
resources four times greater than those of their own, would have to fight it out.”263 
 
The United Kingdom, cabling its consulate in Washington D.C. was also trying to find the 
American position.  Sir P. Dean was able to meet and see Mr. Dean Rusk, the head of the 
American State Department to discuss the India-Pakistan war. 
“As regards Auyb’s request invoking the 1959 American Assurance, the United States 
Government did not accept Pakistani denials of infiltration across the cease-fire line and 
indeed had plenty of evidence both from UNMOGIP and American intelligence sources 
that infiltration had taken place.  The clear implication in Mr. Rusk’s remarks was that 
there was no basis for Pakistan to invoke the 1959 Assurance.”264 
 
Secretary of State Rusk was also concerned with the external considerations: 
“The State Department were watching Chinese moves very closely and there seemed to 
be no major development so far.  If there were any secret agreement between Pakistan 
and China, the Indian move against Lahore should bring it into the open.  Ayub must 
have been getting some very bad advice, and if there were Chinese-Pakistan collusion, 
the Chinese were taking big risks.  The Russians seemed so far to be adopting much the 
same attitude as the United States although Mr. Rusk had seen a report that they have 
given a private assurance to Shastri (note: India’s Prime Minister) over Kashmir.”265 
 
     The worlds’ bi-polar leaders, Russia and the United States saw no gain for either side to win 
the conflict.  Both sides of the bi-polar world used their international political influence to 
pressure their member states via the United Nations and the two combatants to settle the dispute 
least the war expand.  In a cable to its United Kingdom mission in Washington D.C., on 16 
September 1965 an unidentified author (possibly Britain’s Foreign Secretary Robert Stewart?) 
talks about meeting the U.N. Secretary General U-Thant at the London airport.   
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“The reason for U Thant’s comparative optimism was his assessment that in the last 
resort both parties would accept a joint view of the Four Great Powers.  He therefore 
intended to propose at the Security Council Meeting to be held on 17 September that a 
Committee be formed of United States, Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. to offer their 
good offices.”266   
 
The U.S.S.R. proved instrumental negotiating a cease-fire and peace between India and Pakistan.  
Mr. Aleksey Kosygin, chairman of the Council of Ministers proposed a meeting in Uzbekistan and 
after both sides agreed, they met the U.S.S.R. delegation but not each other.  The Tashkent 
Declaration was signed by Prime Minister Shastri of India and Pakistan President Ayub Khan on 
10 January 1966.  For Pakistan, the reason for going to war with India, aka the Kashmir issue, 
was not even mentioned.267 
     The 1971 East Pakistan war was also a major hegemonic alliance disappointment to Pakistan.  
India, leader of the Non-alignment Movement to counter the bi-polar international politics 
countries were facing, actually relied upon the U.S.S.R. for significant military support.  
President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger saw India’s Russian support as a 
dangerous ‘real politics’ move to disrupt a static bi-polar world.  President Nixon broke federal 
policies and possibly multiple U.S. federal laws in an effort to send fighter aircraft and supplies 
to the Pakistan Air Force.268  He illegally diverted aircraft from other U.S. Air Force foreign 
military sales, had the manufacturer paint on PAF markings and then had the fighter aircraft 
flown first to Turkey, Jordan, and other friendly nations such as Iran where PAF pilots flew them 
back to Pakistan.269  Nixon also called upon other Middle Eastern nations such as Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia to support their Islamic neighbor by sending supplies and their own combat aircraft 
as well.270  Even though the U.S. president ordered the U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet into the Indian 
Ocean as a show of support for Pakistan, the effort was too little too late.  When the Russian 
navy countered the U.S. naval task force by shadowing its ships, neither the U.S. nor the 
91 
 
Russians were willing to risk combat operations which might have started a much larger war and 
possible trigger a world-wide nuclear exchange.   
     Pakistan was also hoping China would side with them but the Chinese were unwilling in 
either the 1965 or 1971 wars to intervene militarily.271  The People’s Republic of China 
Communist leader Mao Zedong was confronting Russia and its threat to the Northern border.  
Relations between the two communist nations were beginning to develop into an open conflict.  
Combat operations against each other had commenced on 2 March 1969.  These military 
operations focused on an island in the Ussuri river which was claimed by both countries.272  
Large scale tank maneuvers, artillery barrage exchanges, and massed troop movements led to a 
stalemate with the Russians threatening their nuclear missiles were aimed at China’s northern 
industrial cities.273  China’s foreign relations with the U.S.S.R. began seriously deteriorating on 
all levels and communist Russia was seen as a threat.274  The Russians and the Chinese were both 
fearful of the United States being in collusion with the other side.275  China was unwilling to aid 
Pakistan with anything more than sharp criticism of U.S. and U.S.S.R. actions at United Nation 
meetings.  In 1971, Pakistan had asked for open Chinese support and President Kahn had hoped 
their new hegemonic world leader would be willing to send its forces on their behalf. 
     Pakistan’s answer from China was the same as the United States’; i.e., a disappointment with 
little to no actual help.  In July 1971, Pakistan’s President Yahya Khan was misled by Secretary 
of State Henry Kissinger.  Upon returning from his first Secret trip to China, he told President 
Khan that Chinese premier Chou En-Lai had informed him China would aid Pakistan with 
military forces if  India invaded East Pakistan.276  China’s Ambassador to Pakistan later 
informed Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan the translation was misunderstood but China 
would help with more than just rhetoric and political backing.277  When Pakistan’s military 
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ammunition supplies were near depletion, President Khan begged the Chinese for help.  The 
British and American ambassadors warned him that Chinese intervention might result in a much 
broader and possibly a nuclear war.278  Their guidance forced him to change his mind and he 
requested China rescind their ultimatum.  In the end, China was fierce on the international public 
affairs front attacking both the Soviet Union and the United States at the United Nations for 
supporting India but military support never arrived.  For all intents and purposes during the war, 
Pakistan was on its own.  
LBS & Management By Crises 
 
     The Tashkent Agreement and Russia aiming nuclear weapons at China not only signaled an 
end to the India-Pakistan war of 1971 it also sounded the death knell of Pakistan’s and North 
Korea’s reliance upon first world leaders.  For Pakistan, the collapse of these hegemonic U.S. 
military alliances led to a collapse of major military equipment support from the western side of 
the International Community.  For North Korea, the China-Russia border dispute and Nixon 
meeting Mao meant an opportunity to play the International Community’s two major communist 
states against each other for even more aid.  The leaders of both countries had to find ways to 
keep the public’s psychology based on the competitive fight while forgoing internal domestic 
needs.  Amazingly, both North Korea and Pakistan with different political systems found the way 
to psychologically manipulate public opinion and that of the International Community. 
     How the two countries’ leaders, whether under civilian or military dictatorship, managed to 
manipulate the general public? It was by using spate of crisis as the mode of governance or 
management.  Using family structure that is recognized worldwide, the analogy here is to 
compare a declared and recognized state/country to that of a nuclear family.  In conjunction, the 
“Bowen theory” is a modern psychological method to treat the entire family’s behavioral 
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interactions and not just the individual.279  The theory states that stressors in the interdependent 
multigenerational family influences variation(s) in nuclear family functioning.280  In essence, 
measured family units show statistically that family sets have stressors or traits that have a 
tendency to continue through the whole family set even influencing the next generation.  The 
Bowen theory did not limit stressor types.   Alcoholism, drug use, physical harm, sexual 
deviance, criminal misconduct and other dysfunctional traits by parental units and/or older 
sibling(s) greatly affects all the family including its younger family members.281  As a learned 
behavior, victims and younger family members believe these traits are a family norm that all 
families share.  If confronted by an outsider who shows that such behavior is not normal, the 
younger family members are either shamed into silence or may end up defending those 
committing the acts in a Stockholm syndrome manner.282  Family cohesion suffers and as a 
result; parental guidance is based on managing crisis after crisis and not dealing with the true 
foundational troubles that beseech the family.  Every problem, no matter its actual size, is treated 
as a major crisis. Anything that can draw attention away from the abnormal behavior becomes 
the focal point of attention.  Family members pick at each other, they form alliances within the 
family, and they break them when needed or required by the crisis at hand.  The competition 
levels of the efforts of the competing family are intensified for all its members.  Rivalries within 
the family are increased as competition for the parent(s)’ attention and the demand for the 
parent(s) engagement to resolve disputes becomes more intense.  Parents can help resolve these 
inner family disputes but they can also use the disputes to formulate resentment between the 
parties and see and reward those who follow their ideas and plans for the family.  Setting family 
culture and establishing the moral norm of the family, the parent(s)’ is/are attempting to rule via 
crisis management in a family in which crises have become the norm. 
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          Taking this analogy to the state level, Pakistan and North Korea have both used 
management by crises as their style of civil governance.  Bloodied by 1947 Partition, Pakistan’s 
initial government lacked a strong central civil voting base and had to rely upon its city-state 
political organizations to help run the country.  Soon after Jinnah died, the central government 
saw these city-states as a threat and tried to dismantle their strong political power and their civil 
voter bases.  The city-states recognized the government’s intent and belittled its legislative 
attempts to create a strong national level front.  Before true national consolidation could occur, 
Pakistan’s badly conceived 1947 war with India interrupted the federal government and its 
attempted plans for full Pakistani nationalism.  Instead, Pakistan’s military became the central 
focus of a nation that likened its military as the only true keeper; i.e. the savior of the country 
and its populace.  So how does the military keep in power?  By creating a threat that only it can 
deal with in order to save Pakistan.  If the Indian threat is not perceived as grave or life 
threatening, then continually harass them using asymmetric warfare, periodic state supported 
terrorism, and/or guerilla tactics so they feel compelled to deploy their military forces on your 
borders.  Management by crises is very effective if you are the state creating the crises. 
     North Korea is also using crisis management as a tool for civil governance.  For North Korea, 
the ominous threat has been and continues to be the United States forces stationed in the South.  
Between 1958 and until their withdrawal in December 1991, the United States kept hundreds of 
nuclear armaments in South Korea.283  North Korea, totally lacking nuclear weapons was at the 
mercy of its international partners, the U.S.S.R. and communist China to provide a credible 
nuclear deterrent.  In the 1980’s, the U.S.S.R. demanded North Korea start paying its debts for 
projects the U.S.S.R. had financed.284  With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, North 
Korea relies primarily upon China for its nuclear deterrence but had started the processes needed 
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to create its own nuclear arms.  The costs of building nuclear capabilities were borne by its allies 
and by its population. 
     In order to maintain control, North Korea used crisis after crisis as a management technique 
to show its populace the country was under constant threats by outsiders.  By creating those 
crises; i.e. acts of terrorism and using asymmetric warfare against the South, the negative 
international publicity this generated was used to the North’s advantage.  The leadership could 
demonstrate to the country how the United States and its western allies wrongly blamed North 
Korea and labeled their country a “pariah” state or as an “axis of evil”.285  Using Gustave Le 
Bon’s repetition technique, these self-caused incidents were used by North Korea to motivate the 
populace’s competitive drive that the leadership thought would help to eventually defeat the 
enemies of the state.286   
 
LBS & The Use of Religion 
     A major significant variable both Pakistan and North Korean leaders use in their control of 
the state is religion.  On 4 July 1977, General Zia ul-Haq came to power via military coup 
against Zulfikar Bhutto.287 The opposition party, Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) had called 
Bhutto the anti-thesis of Islam and had urged his ouster.  General Haq had PNA supporters 
placed in his cabinet and attempted to use the Islamic faith as a national unifier.  He did so by 
declaring Pakistan an Islamic religious state and by institutionalizing Islamic practices within the 
military first and later within government departments and agencies.288  Shariah law, which had 
many civil supporters became Pakistan’s foundation of its legal system.  Through the years, this 
concentration on Islam has intensified and has lead religious political parties to call for a stricter 
interpretation and practice of Islam by all members of society.289   
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     Pakistan as a nation uses Islam as a way to bolster its military members and as a religious 
intensifier for its goal to reunify Jammu and Kashmir.290    These two provinces have been used 
as a religious goal and seen and/or treated as Pakistan’s Islamic holy grail.  The goal to gain this 
‘forbidden’ territory taken away by Hindu India is a high moral cause for Pakistan’s military, its 
government leaders and its civil populace.  By creating a higher moral cause, Pakistan is allowed 
to be a country full of corrupt government officials, of weak and failing political, educational, 
and state institutions, of having an ineffective legal system with rampant police corruption, and 
where religious intolerance is allowed.291   The moral and righteous cause is to reclaim Jammu 
and Kashmir and it is this cause that is the country’s concentrated focus.  Not the cries for fair 
elections, not for better school funding and state infrastructure repairs, not the calling for justice 
in the Taliban shooting of 14 year old Malala Yousufzai advocating for girls education in the 
Swat Valley of Pakistan.292    These are simply crises to be used by power brokers and to be dealt 
with internally.  As a nation, Pakistan may be dysfunctional but it is still a working national 
government and maintains armed forces capable and willing to defend the country and if 
necessary, with nuclear weapons.  The idea to use the Islamic religion as a means to unify the 
country and unite its people, “…can be interpreted as a state project gone awry.”293 
     North Korea’s leaders also use the techniques of a religious cult in order to remain in power 
while focusing on its moral goal of reuniting the country.  The use of cult tactics began with 
North Korea’s first leader, Kim il-Sung: 
“He has shown that obsession by his own actions, by those of functionaries representing 
him, and by his acceptance of the officially inspired adultation as it intensified during the 
1950s. Since the establishment of the DPRK in 1948, he has made no single, genuine 
gesture (as Lenin did),25 or shown the mask of modesty (as Mao did),26 to discourage his 
growing personality cult. Besides, his chuch'e ideology, especially with respect to the 
individual superman-like leadership, by itself serves as a ready-made rationalization for 
encouraging and sustaining the Kim cult. Seen in this context, it is not farfetched to say 
that Kim Il-song has been the master builder of his own cult.”294 
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In order to keep state power within the family, Kim il-Sung’s lineage has had to do the same.  
Even communist countries that were friendly to North Korea such as the East “German 
Democratic Republic” embassy in Pyongyang would describe its leader unflatteringly: 
“The economic situation in the DPRK is indeed extremely difficult and complicated. The 
main reasons for this are the cult of personality [surrounding Kim IL Sung] and the 
subjectivism deriving from it.295 
 
 New York Times writer Nicholas Kristoff, while reporting in 1989 wrote about the North 
Koreans Juche policy to revitalize the country: 
 “In the 1980s Juche has become the symbolic self-portrait of North Korea at the primary  
 stage of Kim dynastic succession. North Korea today is "not so much a nation as a  
 religion," writes an American journalist, where Kim Il Sung ("the Great Leader" or the  
 father), Kim Jong IL ("the Dear Leader" or the son) and the holy spirit of Juche all blend  
 and blur into the holy trinity of national worship.31” 296 
 
In order to keep control, North Korea’s leadership has had to ensure there is no organized 
religion other than that for the nation’s leader.  For example: 
“Since the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the complete persecution of all religion by a state 
seems limited to exotic places such as North Korea.”297 
 
As a foundation to control its civil population, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will 
surely continue the cult worship of its national leader into the unforeseen future. 
 
LBS & Universal Family Norms 
     Considering the unusual political systems in both countries, my first questions I researched 
was whether or not nuclear families in South Asia as well as the Far East, in this case Korea, are 
similar enough to be considered together as a group.  In one of the very first family Asian studies 
conducted in Korea, authors Julie Lee, Charles Super and Sara Harkness studied 750 South 
Korean children living in Seoul.  The children’s ages ranged from kindergarten through the 
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seventh grade.  The authors studied the self-perception of competence in children using age, sex 
and home influences using Harter’s scales for children.298  In the first of its kind, their 
experiment included Korean culture as a variable for children’s self-perceived competence.299  
Their results found remarkable similarities to European and American family standards used to 
predict higher self-perceived competence.   
“Traditional parental discipline and guidance are found to be significant for the 
development of self-perceived competence in Korean collectivist social skills, but  
not in peer acceptance, which is, instead, promoted by a nuclear family structure and  
high parental education.”300       
 
At the end of the study, the authors found the families’ nuclear structure and members’ self-
perceptions were the same standards found to be the most consistent for Asian as well as Euro-
American families.   
     The second question I researched was how important culture is to a family and its impact on 
specifically Asian nuclear families.  For East Asia, Confucianism and filial piety, the virtue of 
showing respect for one’s parents and ancestors, were researched.  My concern was how well the 
modern Asian nuclear family structure supports these traditional cultural family beliefs.  While 
researching ‘Life Satisfaction Among Korean Children’, Nansook Park found that Korean 
culture emphasizes filial piety, parental control, harmony, family obligations and respect for 
older siblings.301  In the results of her study, the nuclear family plays a key role: 
“Across all ages, satisfaction with the family domain was an important predictor of  
global LS (Life Satisfaction).  These results demonstrate the crucial effect of satisfaction 
with the family relationship on Korean children and youth’ overall well-being, even at a 
time when peer relationships might seem to be more important.”302 
 
Park goes on to say: 
“…the relationship between self domain and global LS necessarily become stronger with 
age.  This finding is counter to the assumption that people from collectivistic culture like 
Korea place a higher value on group norms and needs and a lesser value on an 
independent self (Kitayama and Markus, 1995).  Even for youth from a collectivistic 
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culture like Korea, satisfaction with the self takes on increasing important for their global 
well-being.  The important of the ‘self’ for adolescents seems more ubiquitous than a 
strict application of the individualistic versus collectivistic paradigm would imply.”303 
 
In short, Asian families share a remarkable similarity with European and American families 
concerning their children.  In all three groups, the developmental well-being of persons, 
particularly at an early age, has an impact that will last throughout their lives.  As Helen Sung 
suggests, “As people become more aware and understand the need for early promotion for 
emotional intelligence, it could have a profound impact on the quality of human interactions 
across the globe.”304 
     In South Asia including Pakistan, the family is also the fundamental unit of society.305  For 
Pakistan, 95% of the population follow the Islamic religion though there are different Islamic 
religious sects throughout the country.306  As a religion, “… the family unit is central to Islam, 
and relations between the sexes are defined exclusively in terms of that unit.”307  When 
describing societal norms in Pakistani families, medical practitioner and author Farhat Moazam, 
states the following: 
“In contrast to the pluralistic society of the United States, Pakistan offers a fairly 
homogenous milieu insofar as values and socio-cultural norms are concerned.       
Religious belief plays a central role in the life of men and women from all social       
strata and is a major influence on all public and private activities.”308 
 
He goes on to say that the oldest son is given special authorities when describing family norms 
such as medical decisions for the older family members: 
“As families are both hierarchical and patrilineal, the oldest male member plays a pivotal 
role in major decisions, with a varying degree of input from the patient and other family 
members.”309 
 
Like Western families, older siblings are also supposed to help younger family members. 
 
“In Pakistan, according to Zaman, help is usually sought from an authority figure within 
the family, usually a parent or older sibling, who is expected to be not only supportive 
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and facilitative, but also directive in the advice given.[18] This is construed as a sign of 
caring rather than as an intrusive act.”310 
 
 
But intrusive acts do occur in families and the inaction of older siblings trying to make decisions 
without any in-puts from the younger family members does have an impact on them.  The 
youngest siblings are given proof that they have no impact on major family decisions and do not 
warrant being consulted.  The fear of not mattering at all can be a serious detriment 
psychologically and it can also be used to drive the need to be extra competitive in dealing with 
other human beings.   
 
Chapter Six 
Conclusion 
 
      Morgenthau’s “Realism Theory” was written at the beginning of the Cold War era and 
helped define how Social Science and Political Science explained world trends.311  A counter 
argument is that the world adapted to the intricacies of Realism and governments and their 
leaders used Realism as a framework of reference for making key leadership and state decisions.  
Either way, Morgenthau’s realism theory contains the premise that states are defined as single 
individuals who act rationally and for their own best interests.  Quoting Martin Griffiths,  
“In Morgenthau’s view, ‘the relations between nations are not essentially different from 
the relations between individuals; they are only relations between individuals on a wider 
scale’.12 Thus in order to understand the behavior of states it is necessary to begin with 
individual behavior as the explanation.”312 
 
Looking back historically during the time when nuclear weapons and Morgenthau’s theory were 
first being developed, Morgenthau’s theory is also based on the premise and belief that every 
state; i.e., every individual has an adversary.   
101 
 
     While Morgenthau’s ideas of the politics of man still ring true, what happens to his theory if 
the state or individual is not acting rationally?  Morgenthau’s politics has been challenged 
throughout the years but his argument has withstood the test of time for most of his audiences.  
Realism combined with Kensyian economics gave the Western nations opposing the bipolar 
world’s Communists armed with nuclear weapons the ample monies, scientific methods, and 
military capabilities to oppose the adversary.  The United States and its allies were victorious in 
their Horatio Alger struggle. Was the Cold War rational?  If you’re the winner it certainly was 
and it also reinforces your belief in your ‘winning’ theories.   
     The best Devil’s Advocate argument against Morgenthau was actually written before 
Morgenthau ever penned his theory.  In All Quiet On The Western Front, the hero’s mentor asks 
the question,  
“So…. A German mountain insulted a French mountain?  A French field called the 
German field ugly names?  No.  War is sought by man and fought by men.  To that I am 
certain.”313  
 
Hence, if a state is not geographical territory but a collective agreement of men and 
women, are they rational if they go to kill other men and women who do not hold the same 
beliefs?  The realism theory premise of adversarial relationships most certainly holds true but the 
rationality premise is questionable.  The Little Brother Syndrome helps fill this gap. 
     The Little Brother Syndrome does not contest the Realism Theory’s premise of adversarial 
relationships but it does contest rationality.  What the Little Brother Syndrome theory states is 
that competitiveness is a major factor that enhances or sometimes overrules rationality of 
individuals and states.  If states are to be reduced into a single entity or individual, the best 
method to handle the relationships of the state is to look at how the state developed in the same 
manner as how individuals are raised in families.  Despite what family counselors, social 
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psychologists and statisticians may want to believe, the families of the world are not the 
“nuclear” mom and dad with a single son and a single daughter.  Psychologically, families can be 
loving and supportive of each member’s role(s).  Families can also be mean, cruel, heartless and 
downright despicable.  More often than not, families are a soft mixture of the two while mostly 
driving down the middle of the psychological road between the extremities.   
     Little Brother sees the sites differently from his perspective than the other family members do 
in theirs’.  Each member of the nuclear family has their roles and responsibilities as ordained by 
the parents, society, and cultural norms.  As the decision makers, parents use their authority to 
rule over the household as well as sustain the family with food, clothing, medicine and shelter / 
housing.  The older to oldest sibling(s) are also given responsibilities in large families to help 
take care of and watch over their younger siblings.  The youngest members of the family are 
given few if any responsibilities to help provide for the family and as the last person in line, 
receives the most corrections both physically and psychologically from the whole of the family 
from the parents on down.  Youngest brothers and sisters, other than themselves, have the least 
amount of control for their situations they face internally within the family.   This is what helps 
starts Little Brother Syndrome’s competitive nature.  Little Brother wants to be seen and treated 
as an equal within the family organizational structure.  Being seen as an equal member may 
never occur but it never stops little brother from trying to meet an almost impossible goal.   
     The second aspect of Little Brother’s perceptions is the strive to right a wrong that he feels 
has occurred against him usually by a much older brother or by a single or both parental 
authority figures.  Many sociologists refer to this as a simple case of sibling rivalry.314  The term 
however is used exclusively as a condition of discontent or worse between the children of the 
family and does not include either parent.  Family psychologists often limit their research to only 
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the family member that is having problems adjusting to their family roles and responsibilities.  
Often diagnosed as a problem child or dysfunctional sibling, it is the treatment of the younger 
sibling only and not the older sibling that reinforces his own believes that an injustice is further 
enhanced and nothing will be done about the true cause of the problem; i.e. in little brother’s 
mind, his older brother.  In reverse, the older brother often does not even realize there is a 
problem.  He is simply correcting the behavior of an unruly little brother who needs to learn what 
his family and his society expects of this new member.  To the older brother’s perception, there 
is no wrong that has been committed on his part and since he too needed to be corrected by his 
parents this is a normal life occurrence.  In this case, he is simply substituting as a parental unit 
and is meeting the goals as set by the parent(s).  Though he may not even know it, a simmering 
feud has been started and unless little brother is allowed to right the wrong no matter what minor 
circumstance may have caused it; little brother’s competitive overdrive has been started.  Until 
corrected, little brother will continue to use, in his mind, whatever method he thinks is 
appropriate to right the wrong, to put a stop to the injustice and force the parent(s) to realize he is 
an equal member and he does not have to tolerate their inaction(s) any further. 
     The third major component of Little Brother Syndrome is the presence of fear.  Fear is the 
engine that sets Little Brother Syndrome’s compelling competitive overdrive into action and in 
turn focuses the psychological drive to right the moral wrong.  In bridging the gap between 
psychology and physiology, Dr. Walter Cannon first proposed the original “fight or flight” 
response in both animals and humans.315  When little brother thinks he is faced with an extreme 
life or death situation; the body is forced into a psychological fight or flight condition.  The brain 
may tell the body to prepare for battle against the attacker and try to overcome this known threat; 
or, the brain may tell the body to flee in order to preserve itself.  The fight or flight response is as 
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basic a human psychological characteristic as the physiological parts that make up the human 
body.  For Little Brother Syndrome the obvious choice is to use and turn his fear into strength 
and accomplish the impossible.  Whether it is the Jammu and Kashmir provinces or the 
reunification of North and South Korea, little brother wants to do battle and overcome the 
injustice, the inaction of those in authority, and to right the moral wrongs that have been 
perpetuated against the country by a larger force that may militarily conquer it at any time.  By 
doing so, little brother will then gain their respect and be accepted as an equal in their 
international realm once and for all. 
 
Little Brother Syndrome Theory 
Summation 
 
     The Little Brother Syndrome analysis is, and will be, controversial due its downward focus on 
the family and its younger members’ life experiences.  LBS runs against the ideological groups 
and institutions of current liberal and realist social science thoughts, policies and theories.  LBS 
will be interpreted as being too narrowly focused, too concentrated on the early lives of leaders 
in which undoubtedly leaders continue to learn throughout their lives to make much ado 
regarding their childhood experiences.  In explicit terms, adults run and rule states and nations, 
not children.  Like the term ‘sibling rivalry’, critics will accuse LBS as being used for a good 
analogy but as a possible theory it lacks the credibility and predictability of forecasting a state’s 
actions for future events yet unforeseen. The primary international comparative politics question 
is “Would LBS qualify as a theory as defined by PhD Robert Keohane of Harvard University?” 
“Even if one could eradicate theory from one's mind, it would be self- defeating to try. 
No one can cope with the complexities of world politics without the aid either of a theory 
or of implicit assumptions and propositions that substitute, however poorly, for theory. 
Reality has to be ordered into categories, and relationships drawn between events. To 
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prefer a theoretical activity over theoretically informed practice would be to seek to be 
guided by an unexamined jumble of prejudices, yielding conclusions that may not 
logically follow from the assumptions, rather than by beliefs based on systematic 
attempts to specify one's assumptions and to derive and test propositions.”316 
 
    Little Brother Syndrome is not envisioned as the single end all social science theory that 
explains all actions within the international relations realm.  LBS is meant to be an explanatory 
theory  which returns the academic focus back to the original international comparative politics’ 
concept: Individual nations have their own set of lenses in which they see the world.317  The LBS 
goal is to help explain certain states’ actions while nations act and react within the international 
community.  The LBS analysis states the best way to understand a state’s or states’ actions is to 
use the first institution that all mankind is exposed to in their very beginning; the family.  By 
studying the interactions between family members, LBS proposes the advancement of 
international comparative politics by using family norms as a basis of ICP analysis.  Like 
Amaryta Sen’s “Development As Freedom” in which his proposal is to look at the end result as 
the true variable to the cause, LBS proposes the same methodology.318  To understand a nation 
and its leaders, LBS says to look at how the nation was initially created and to also look and see 
how its major political and military leaders were raised in their families.  The LBS theory states 
comparative results will lead to a better understanding of how certain states behave in the 
international community and LBS will also assist both the social scientist and the layman by 
showing how the world works.   
     The Western world currently has three or four major schools of thought within the social 
sciences realm; realism, pluralism (also called liberalism), Globalism and the English School of 
International Relations dealing with human rights.  The quintessential leader of realism is Hans 
Morgenthau and his original theory’s four pillars that explain international relations.  He 
theorized one) the international system is anarchic, two) states / nations are the greatest 
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important actors, three) all states are rational actors, and four) their main concern is survival of 
the state/nation.  By naming his theory “realism”, he psychologically hit the bull’s eye 
supporting his theory with the name itself.  Realism was just that; it was real and used to 
represent the real world.  One cannot argue the world does not operate in real fashion, in real 
time, and real men work, struggle, and make war on each other in the real world.   
     In 1947 when Morgenthau enunciated his realism theory, he gave credit to the newly created 
nuclear weapon as a catalyst that would change the history of warfare and the history of man, his 
nation, and even the world.319   His critics claimed Morgenthau left out important segments or 
elements that make up a state.  States, his critics argued, are not a single actor, but consist of 
multiple internal actors who try to use or guide the state in a manner that will help it continue 
into the future.  Ironically, Morgenthau could have just have easily been interpreted as a college 
professor teaching basic biology 101 and how lower biological life forms such as cells survive, 
grow, multiply and/or create higher complex life forms.  The beauty of Morgenthau’s theory is 
that he uses clearly identifiable works such as those by Thucydides, Otto Von Bismarck and 
Clausewitz, to build his case.  Morgenthau used the building blocks educational theory of the day 
to describe the international system.  By using this teaching method, ordinary people could easily 
associate their own lives and actions within a simplistic yet plausible international relations 
theory called realism.   
     The other three main schools of thought, Liberalism, Globalism and the English School all 
reject realism’s unitary state actor basis while differentiating which actors should be considered 
major state players.320  Critics such as Imre Lakatos in the 1970’s refuted realism stating it did 
not meet his standards that theories ought to be progressive and be able to generate new ideas 
while reinforcing the core ideal.321  Pluralism states other actors such as multinational 
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corporations, military alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and other 
legislative or judicial power players can help or hurt the state in its foreign relations.  Globalism 
is more focused on the economies of countries but it is also focused on how capitalism is now 
being seen as the new world order.  That economic world order is what creates interdependencies 
and leads to nations being dependent on Western Europe and the United States’ world trade.   
The English School believes in the whole world concept but writers such as Headly Bull believe 
states that make up the international community set the standards for realism’s anarchy.  English 
school theorizes that a country’s ideas are more important than realism’s material gains when 
explaining a state’s actions.  While English School was seen as an attempt to use both realism 
and liberalism’s strong points, its critics call for an end to this theory since its writers are not 
primarily from England nor provides a strong enough case based on history to merge the two 
theories together.322 
     The strongest two theories to compare Little Brother Syndrome against are Neo-Realism and 
Neo-Liberalism.  Neo-Realism’s champion, Kenneth Waltz has written about how the 
international system is anarchic due to the fact there is no overseeing government.  His Theory 
of International Politics is not predictive of the system nor does it focus on any particular 
state.323  Waltz has written extensively on the proliferation of nuclear weapons and he theorizes it 
will bring peace to the international community.324  Nuclear weapons forces states to normalize 
their relations least the states initiate nuclear war which would be far too costly for both sides. 
     Debating Waltz’s Neo-Realism with that of Neo-Liberalism, Robert Keohane a liberal 
Constructivist wrote Neorealism and Its Critics.  In chapter one, the book states: 
 
“Keohane suggests the need for a revised theory that incorporates Waltz's notion of 
structure but that takes seriously, as explanatory factors, elements of the international 
system not included in Waltz's limited conception of structure.325 
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Ironically, Keohane then goes on to dismiss alternative theories that are based on human 
behavior(s) of political leaders and/or the state as a singular actor.  When discussing the use of 
human behavior theory on the causalities of conflicts, i.e. war, he states: 
"Explanations of international conflict as resulting from human nature are vulnerable to 
severe criticism. As Waltz ( 1959:39) argues, they blame a small number of behavior 
traits for conflict, ignoring more benign aspects of human nature that point in the 
opposite direction. Furthermore, such theories fail to explain variations in warfare over 
time and space: if human nature is constant, why shouldn't warfare be constant as 
well?”326 
 
Robert Keohane the Constructivist and Kenneth Waltz the Realist debated about which theory 
was more inclusive and could be used to help predict actions in the realm of international 
relations, but neither side greatly expounded outside the boundaries of their own theories.  
Neither Keohane nor Waltz tried to bridge the gap between the two theories.  Each regarded his 
as the true solution.  Other noted neoliberalists such as Harvard’s John Ruggie and formerly 
Princeton’s Fredrich Kratochwil were arguing that it was not just the sole state actor that should 
be the focus of international relations theories.327  Liberalism’s institutionalists argued the other 
major actors that comprised a state were the institutions founded by economists, by judicial 
bodies, by legislative assemblies, or by the military used to defend the state or used in offensive 
modes to seize power, peoples, territory or valuable material assets.  Institutionalists believe the 
multiple actors that comprise a state’s structure use their power internally to guide the state’s 
actions. 
     In one of his latest works “Institutions, Law and Governance in a Partially Globalized 
World”, Keohane’s writing reflects how both neo-liberals and structural neo-realists have agreed 
to the importance of institutions: 
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“The purpose of this introduction is, first of all, to elucidate this conception of how the 
world works. It is both individualist and institutionalist, regarding institutions both as 
created by human action and as structuring that action. The principal motor of action in 
this view is self-interest, guided by rationality, which translates structural and 
institutional conditions into payoffs and probabilities, and therefore incentives. But my 
conceptions of self-interest and rationality are broad ones. Self-interest is not simply 
material; on the contrary, it encompasses one's interest in being thought well of, and in 
thinking well of oneself. One's self-interest is not divorced from one's principled ideas or 
identity but closely connected with them.”328  
 
So while in his earlier career he dismissed human behavior based international relation theories, 
Keohane has broadened his neo-liberalism viewpoints to include singular self-interest and a 
person’s self-identity.329 
     The Little Brother Syndrome theory fits among the other major social and political science 
theories by bridging realism and liberalism together.  As a theory, Little Brother Syndrome uses 
the foundational work of realism and its anarchy in intrastate relations pillar.  The use of force, 
whether economically, politically or militarily by a state which has the capability and flexibility 
to choose which method to use and the time and place to do so remains the critical factor.  The 
end of the bi-polar world did not eliminate this fact nor did it end Pakistan’s or North Korea’s 
quest for the single largest destructive force known in the world; thermonuclear weapons.   
     The second realism pillar used by LBS is the state as a single actor.  In the case of both North 
Korea and in Pakistan, the lure of power has kept the same family in power for North Korea and 
the overall number of Pakistan’s leaders has remained relatively small.  Since its 1947 creation, 
there have only been 10 or more separate rulers of Pakistan.  Of the ten leaders, four or 40% 
were military officers seizing power via a military coup.330  As a semi-democratic country, the 
military seized control of the government due to the lack of political infrastructure, political 
parties with national callings, and with the inability of its first civil rulers to consolidate the 
political power of Pakistan’s original strong willed city-state political entities.  Pakistan’s 
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troubles as a military state arose from the lack of nationalistic parties incorporating the different 
social and religious groups the country contained.  The lack of resolve among its political leaders 
to transcend social classes as well as the dominant and minor Islamic religions into a single 
group of united supporters has had devastating effects on the country’s stability as well as its 
civil infrastructure and political culture.   
     LBS however sides with the liberal academia when it comes to realism’s rationality.  Little 
Brother Syndrome came about as a result of a film I first saw in college called “21 Up” of the   
“Seven Up” movie series.331  The film’s producers wanted to know if character traits developed 
in a person’s early years stayed with them throughout their lives.  As the film demonstrated with 
its subjects, the theory stands true.  One of my friends while I was in college at Florida State 
University was a Viet-Nam combat veteran.  His thought about the movie was one of his life 
lessons learned.  “You can keep running,” he said, “but no matter what happens, you will always 
show up.”  I translated this thought into not just the people who take up the leadership roles of a 
state but I also included the state itself within my LBS theory.  The characteristics of the state for 
both North Korea and for Pakistan have remained the same since their beginnings.  Is it rational 
for states and their leaders to never change or improve?  Certainly not, but as my theory shows it 
does help keep those who want to control a state to stay in power.  Pakistani leaders, both 
military and civilian stay in power as a result of the population not connecting with the state in a 
nationalistic manner but as a religious connection as defined by the state.  For North Korea, the 
dictatorial family of Kim il-Sung picked none other than Kim Jong-il and now Kim Jong-un to 
rule North Korea.  If you want to keep the state’s LBS characteristics continuing into the future, 
pick the youngest member of the family.  Both of them were literally the youngest little brothers 
of their families.  LBS strikes again. 
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     LBS theory also uses the neo-liberal belief of constructivism’s institutions but with a realist’s 
perspective they are allowed to remain but as a tool to control the civil populations.  Both 
countries, the leaders and the populace, view dissent as treasonous and use religion as a means of 
enforcing state control.  Pakistan relies upon Islam as a national unifier but has found itself 
caught in a hail-storm of religious intolerance by different Islamic sects all claiming to be the 
true source for Islam.332, 333  The use of Islam was a tragic misstep by ul-Haq but Pakistan’s 
national government lacks the resolve to correct its mistake.  Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are 
now the new unifier but at what cost if a national strategic mistake is made?  The same is true for 
North Korea and its cult worship of its national leader(s).  North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear 
weapons was to counteract the military capabilities of its primary foes on its own.  The trouble 
lies not in Pakistan’s or North Koreas nuclear capabilities, the trouble is the characteristics of 
both states as well as the characteristics of their leaders.  Little Brother does not like to be 
ignored by its parental units, the international community, and will continue to cause crisis after 
crisis until Little Brother gets what he wants. 
     The LBS irony is that while Neo-Liberalists and Neo-Realists appear to be agreeing on 
institutions, they have forgotten or overlooked the most basic human institution of all; the 
nuclear family.  A family is the very first institution that every human being is born into yet 
social scientists have ignored or refused to use the family in meaningful theories.  A family may 
consist of many actors or it may only be the mother and child.  Regardless of the size or the 
number of actors, its conception is a world-wide occurrence that almost every single human 
being experiences.  As a theory, Little Brother Syndrome uses the origins of realism and 
liberalism and acts as a bridge between the two major divisions.  By using family structures and 
how its youngest male members act and react within it, Little Brother Syndrome has its origins 
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from and may be applicable to the greatest majority of this single largest institution here on 
planet Earth.   
     As what Kenneth Waltz called an explanatory system, Little Brother Syndrome may help 
explain why the processes of international relations occur as they do.334  As with the Seven Up 
series, human characteristics are learned responses that are ingrained in each of us and we do not 
lose the original thoughts, responses, and decisions that help make up who we each are.  Little 
Brother Syndrome is simply how little brothers are self-taught by their surroundings to be 
competitive, demanding of themselves and others, to fight what they believe is the good fight 
and be recognized as an equal by the world.  Little Brother has his own set of lenses to look 
through when he sees the world.  With luck and by putting on his lenses, Little Brother 
Syndrome may even help predict why those nations who are now free of a bi-polar world and 
whose peoples have risen during this Arab Spring to create free nations and new governments do 
the things that they do. 
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